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Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin have proven to be a phenomenal success. e un-
derlying techniques hold huge promise to change the future of nancial transactions, and
eventually the way people and companies compute, collaborate, and interact. At the same
time, the current Bitcoin-like proof-of-work based blockchain systems are facing many
challenges. In more detail, a huge amount of energy/electricity is needed for maintaining
the Bitcoin blockchain. In addition, their security holds if the majority of the computing
power is under the control of honest players. However, this assumption has been seriously
challenged recently and Bitcoin-like systems will fail when this assumption is broken.
is research proposes novel blockchain designs to address the challenges. We
rst propose a novel blockchain protocol, called 2-hop blockchain, by combining proof-
of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms. at said, even if the adversary controls
more than 50% computing power, the honest players still have the chance to defend
the blockchain via honest stake. en we revise and implement the design to obtain a
practical cryptocurrency system called Twinscoin. In more detail, we introduce a new
strategy for diculty adjustment in the hybrid blockchain and provide an analysis of
ix
it. We also show how to construct a light client for proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies and
evaluate the proposal practically. We implement our new design. Our implementation
uses a recent modular development framework for blockchains, called Scorex. It allows
us to change only certain parts of an application leaving other codebase intact.
x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [Nak08] have proven to be a phenomenal success. e
underlying techniques hold a huge promise to change the future of nancial transactions,
and eventually our way of computation and collaboration. At the heart of the Bitcoin
system is a global public distributed ledger, called blockchain, that records transactions
between users in consecutive time windows. e blockchain is maintained by a peer-
to-peer network of nodes called Bitcoin miners via the so-called proof-of-work (PoW)
mechanism: in each time window, cryptographic puzzles (also called proof-of-work puz-
zles [DN93; Bac02]) are generated, and all miners are encouraged/incentivized to solve the
puzzles; the rst miner who nds a puzzle solution is allowed to extend the blockchain
with a block of transactions, and at the same time he can collect a reward. It is easy to
see that the more computing power a miner invests, the beer his chances are at solving
a puzzle rst.
Bitcoin is an open system; any player who invests a certain amount of computing
resources is allowed to join the eort of maintaining the blockchain. is unique “easy
to join/leave” feature along with a smart incentive strategy help the system “absorb”1 a
huge amount of computing resources over the past several years. Intuitively, the security
of blockchain is backed up by a signicant network of physical computing resources.
is intuition has recently been investigated in academia. For example, Garay et
1You may say the system consumes/wastes a huge amount of computing resources.
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al. [GKL15] and then Pass et al. [PSS17a] looked into the “core” of the Bitcoin system, the
Nakamoto consensus protocol; they showed that, assuming the majority of mining power
in the Bitcoin system is controlled by the honest miners, then the Nakamoto consensus
indeed satises several important security properties as dened in their cryptographic
models. On the other hand, if this assumption does not hold, then the security of the
Bitcoin system cannot be guaranteed.
is assumption has been seriously challenged: the mining power can be dangerously
distributed in the system. For example, in 2014, the mining pool GHash.io exceeded 50%
of the computational power in Bitcoin [Goo14]. Currently, top mining pools including
F2Pool, AntPool, BTCC and BW, are all in China; they collectively control about 60%
mining power. It is not clear if those mining pools collude. Very recently, one mining
pool has had 50% mining power in Zcash [Tor]. Eorts have been made to address this
crisis. In [Mil+15], novel ideas are introduced to discourage the formation of mining pools.
However, it is not clear in practice how to utilize these ideas to protect the system if the
adversary controls the majority of mining power. We here ask the following question:
Is that possible to strengthen Bitcoin-like system so that it can be secure even
when the adversary controls more than 50% computing power in the system?
1.2 Our Considerations
Before giving a proper solution to the above question, we need to understand
Nakamoto’s design more. Only then, we might be able to mimic Nakamoto’s footprint
and push this line of design further.
Leveraging the power of virtual resources in the system. Ideally, we would like to
construct Bitcoin-like blockchain which is secure against a very strong adversary even
from the beginning. However, it is easy to see that cryptocurrency systems are very frag-
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ile in their early stage. It will be extremely dicult, if not impossible, to “grow” a stable
Bitcoin-like blockchain if the adversary controls the majority of computing power at the
very beginning. In this work, we consider how to make an already mature cryptocur-
rency system such as the current Bitcoin system to be more robust in the sense that the
system remains stable even the adversary controls the majority of computing power. As
mentioned, Bitcoin already “absorbed” a huge amount of honest computing power; note
that these physical resources have been converted into “virtual resources”, i.e., the coins.
It is fairly reasonable to assume the coins are nicely distributed in the system and most of
them are controlled by honest users. A natural way to go is to use this huge amount of
honest virtual resources as a buer to defend against the adversary who can dominate the
network of computing power.
e dierence between physical resources and virtual resources. It is denitely
desirable to utilize the power of virtual resources to secure a blockchain. If successful, the
new system will be “green” in the sense that it does not require a huge amount of physical
resources, which cannot be recycled, to back up its security. Aempts have beenmade. For
example, proof-of-stake (PoS) mechanisms have been widely discussed in the cryptocur-
rency community. In a nutshell, proof-of-stake mechanisms for consensus require proto-
col players to prove ownership of a certain amount of virtual resources. Only those that
can provide such a proof can participate in maintaining the blockchain. However, it is not
clear how to construct an open blockchain which can scale to a large number of network
nodes (as in Bitcoin), via any proof-of-stake mechanism. At a very intuitive level, virtual
resources, which proof-of-stake mechanisms are based on, are very dicult to manage
in a practical protocol. SS is intuition has been conrmed recently by the concurrent
works of [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17]); there, very interesting and non-trivial aempts have
been made to construct provably secure, scalable blockchains via pure proof-of-stake. Un-
fortunately, these solutions cannot scale to a large number of network nodes in an open
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seing where participants can freely join or leave the system any time they want. In more
details, a secure bootstrapping mechanism (i.e., majority voting) is required for ensuring
new participants can securely join the system. However, this “bootstrapping” cannot scale
to a large network. See Section 1.3 (Related Work) for more discussion. In one word, it
seems it is extremely dicult to mimic Nakamoto’s footprint via virtual resources only.
On the other hand, physical resources are relatively easier to manage. Indeed,
Nakamoto demonstrates to us an amazingly practical protocol via the proof-of-work
mechanism to manage physical computing resource eectively. Alternative physical re-
sources such as a publicly available random beacon or secure hardware can also allow us
to construct fast protocols. See Section 1.3 (RelatedWork) for more discussion about open
blockchain via alternative physical resources.
e practical elegance of using random oracle for cryptocurrency. Although fast
blockchain protocols can be constructed via physical resources such as random beacon or
trusted hardware, there is a signicant drawback in these solutions. at is, the trapdoor
information of the system is possessed by a single party. Currently, it is not clear how
to eliminate such trapdoor information. Interestingly, blockchain via the proof-of-work
mechanism can avoid such issue in practice: the underlying proof-of-work puzzles can be
based on hash functions, and the security of the system can be argued in the so-called ran-
dom oracle model. eoretical cryptographers may criticize random oracle methodology
since it is not sound [CGH98]. However, random oracles do enable an elegant solution to
open blockchains in practice.2
Additional considerations. ere are many reasons that Bitcoin has become a success-
ful system. For example, proof-of-work puzzles Bitcoin is a divisible e-cash system [OO92;
2 We note that Nakamoto’s design is consistent with the folklore wisdom of a “nothing
up my sleeve number” [Wikd] which has been widely used in practical cryptographic
designs.
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Oka95]. Besides the pointswe discussed above, to design a practical blockchain, we in gen-
eral should avoid heavy cryptographic tools, and use only standard cryptographic primi-
tives such as hash functions and digital signature schemes. Futhermore, the design should
be simple. Finally, the provable security approach should be taken to develop blockchain
techniques. We eventually should move these powerful blockchain techniques from an
art to a science.
1.3 Related work
1.3.1 Closely related work on combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake
Proof-of-activity. e idea of combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake has been
studied in [KN12; Cry14; Ben+14], and the latest one, proof-of-activity (PoA) [Ben+14] is
closest to our work. Although these studies showed that their protocols are secure against
some classes of aacks, they do not provide any formal security model and analysis relying
on precise denitions. We note that the earlier proposal [Ben+14] is dierent from our
result on both security analysis and the construction.
First, the leader election mechanism in PoA design is predictable. More specically,
miners generate empty block header and then the header will be mapped toN stakehold-
ers, where N ≥ 1 and typically N is set as 3. ey use deterministic mapping function
to elect exact N stake holders (see item 3 Figure 2 in [Ben+14]). at said, the adaptive
adversary can easily predict future leaders and corrupt them in advance. As a result, the
protocol will not be secure even if the adversary only controls the minority of stake or
computing power. In contrast, our proposal naturally mimics Nakamoto’s footprint, and
it is the rst adaptively secure proof-of-work / proof-of-stake hybrid consensus protocol.
In addition, we note that the PoA proposal in [Ben+14] will not immediately give us
a divisible cryptocurrency [OO92; Oka95] unless extra eorts are paid.
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Casper. Casper [BG17] is also a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake protocol. Infor-
mally, stakeholders can lock their stakes to be validators, and then vote for each block
whose height is an exact multiple of 100 (i.e., checkpoint). However, this voting-based
protocol only scales to a small number of validators. As the result, the protocol will even-
tually be centralized and the control is in the hand of a small number of participants.
In contrast, our proposal mimics Nakamoto’s footprint so that anyone who has coins
can join the proof-of-stake.
Decred. Another similar proposal is Decred [Jep15]. is proposal needs an additional
trusted entity to produce tickets for participants. Informally, stakeholders will purchase
tickets and check if their tickets are selected. en the stakeholder with the selected ticket
is qualied to produce a new block. Note that, he selection process is pseudo-randomized
where the pseudo-randomness is from the proof-of-work chain.
is design is very similar to our proposal in the sense that the pseudo-randomness
for the elections of stakeholders is from the proof-of-work chain. However, no trusted
party is required in our protocol.
1.3.2 Proof-of-stake
Very recently, concurrent works (e.g., [CM17; Kia+17; PS17; DPS17; Dav+17; FZ17;
Gil+17]) have made very interesting aempts to construct provably secure, scalable
blockchains via PoS only. We note that, our work is fundamentally dierent from these
pure PoS proposals in the following sense: ours is based on the majority of honest collec-
tive resources (including both stake and work), while these pure PoS proposals are based
on the honest majority of stake. Combining stake with work will bring us several bene-
ts. For example, in these pure PoS proposals, the stake holders must have their stakes
registered much earlier before participating in the mining process. In addition, some of
6
these PoS protocols may suer from rational aacks, including nothing at stake aacks
and selsh mining aacks; see [Coh+] for discussions. Our design does not suer from
these aacks.
We already discussed recent eort on provably secure pure proof-of-stake (PoS) pro-
posals [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17] above. Before these recent rigorous eorts, using virtual
resources (i.e., stake) to construct cryptocurrency has been intensively considered in the
Bitcoin community. In a nutshell, the PoS mechanisms for consensus require a protocols’
players to prove ownership of virtual resources. Only those that can provide such proofs
can participate in maintaining the protocol’s blockchain, their ability to do so is propor-
tional to the stake owned. Since the inception of the idea in an online forum [Bit11], sev-
eral variants of PoS that have been proposed and implemented in real cryptocurrencies
including [NXT14; Kwo14; Vas14; BGM16; KN12; Cry14]. In general, a PoS proof sys-
tem simulates random leader election, where each participants’ chance of being elected
is proportional to the amount of stake that they control in the system. e chosen leader
proves that they were elected by providing a cryptographic proof (a digital signature) that
they own a specic share of stake. We note that, these proposals lack of rigorous security
analysis.
1.3.3 Cryptocurrency and security analysis
Anonymous digital currency was introduced by Chaum [Cha82] in the early 1980s.
e rst decentralized currency system, Bitcoin [Nak08], was launched about 30 years
later, by incentivizing a set of players to solve moderately-hard cryptographic puzzles
(also called proofs-of-work puzzles [DN93; Bac02]). Recently, the security of Bitcoin sys-
tem has been analyzed in the rational seing, e.g., [ES14; Eya15; Nay+15; Kia+16; SSZ16;
Sch+16], and also in cryptographic seing [GKL15; PSS17a; SZ15; KP15; KP16]. Several
important security properties, common prex, chain growth, and chain quality, have been
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considered for secure blockchain protocols. e common prex and chain quality prop-
erties were originally formalized by Garay et al. [GKL15]. e chain growth property
was rst formally dened by Kiayias et al. [KP15]. e common prex property was later
strengthened by Pass et al. [PSS17a]. In our study, we adopt the stronger variant of the
common prex property by Pass et al. [PSS17a] together with the chain quality and chain
growth from [KP15; GKL15].
Very recently, Vassilis et al. [Bad+17] propose a simulation-based analysis for Bit-
coin protocol. More specically, they put forth a universally composable treatment of the
Bitcoin protocol, formalizing ledger functionality and leader election (loery) via proof-
of-work, and show that the three security properties can be implied by the ledger func-
tionality.
1.3.4 More alternative consensus techniques
Similar to PoW, alternative consensus techniques via dierent physical resources
have been considered to replace computing power. For example, the physical storage
resource is used in [Par+15; Mil+14; Abu+17]. Between the use of space/memory and the
use of time, are proofs of space time introduced in [MO16]. is is a hybrid proof system
utilizing both computational and space resources. Finally, trusted hardware has been used
for constructing blockchain protocols in [Int16b; Zha+17].
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Cryptography
2.1.1 Notation
roughout this thesis, we denote κ ∈ N as the security parameter. We write {0, 1}κ
as the set of binary strings of length κ and {0, 1}∗ to indicate the set of all nite, binary
strings.
Negligible function. We oen need to show that cryptographic schemes can be broken
with only very small probability that goes to 0 faster than any inverse polynomial. We call
such probabilities, negligible. e formally denition of negligible function is as follows.
Denition 1. We call a function negl negligible if for every polynomial poly, there exists
an N such that for all κ > N , negl(κ) < 1
poly(κ)
2.1.2 Probabilistic inequalities
eorem 1 (Bernoulli’s inequality). For q ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, (1− p)q ≥ 1− pq
eorem 2 (Cherno bounds). Suppose {Xi : i ∈ [n]} are mutually independent Boolean
random variables, with Pr[Xi = 1] = p, for all i ∈ [n]. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = pn.
en, for any δ ∈ (0, 1],
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ e{δ2µ/2} and Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e{δ2µ/3}
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2.1.3 Cryptographic Primitives
2.1.3.1 Collision-resistant hash functions
Generally, hash functions are used to compress any arbitrary-length strings into
shorter strings. More precisely, each hash function H of size κ has a table of length κ,
then for each input string x, it will store x with the corresponding shorter string H(x)
in the table. A hash function should be ”good” in the sense that it only yields as few as
possible pairs of the distinct input x and x′ with the same hash strings, i.e., H(x) = H(x′)
(called collision). Also, collision resistance does not mean that no collisions exist, simply
that they are hard to nd.
Informally, a function H is collision resistant if it is infeasible for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm to nd a collision in H. In other words, collisions should be
very hard to nd. In [LK14], the formal denition of a hash function is as follows.
Note that, for formal presentation, we consider a family of hash functions indexed
by a key s. However, dierent from cryptographic keys, the key s is 1) not kept secret,
and 2) will be generated by an algorithm Gen.
Denition 2. A hash function is a pair of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Gen,H)
satisfying the following:
• Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1κ and
outputs a key s. We assume that 1κ is implicit in s.
• ere exists a polynomial ` such that H takes as input a key s and a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and outputs a string Hs(x) ∈ {0, 1}`(κ) (where κ is the value of the security parameter
implicit in s)
Denition 3. A hash functionΠ = (Gen,H) is collision-resistant if for all polynomial-time
adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that
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Pr[Hash-collA,Π(κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ)
where the experiment Hash-collA,Π(κ) is dened as follows.
e collision-nding experiment Hash-collA,Π(κ):
• A key s is generated by running Gen(1κ).
• e adversary A is given s and outputs x, x′. (If Π is a xed length hash function for
inputs of length `′(κ) then we require x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}`′(κ).)
• e output of the experiment is dened to be 1 if and only if x 6= x ′ and Hs(x) =
Hs(x′). In such a case we say that A has found a collision.
We also emphasize that hash functions used in practice are oen unkeyed. In other
words, a xed hash function H is dened, and there is no longer any notion of a Gen
algorithm. However, it is important to include keys theoretically since it is not clear how
to dene a meaningful notion for the unkeyed hash functions [LK14],
2.1.3.2 Digital signature
Digital signature is a tool to preserve the integrity of messages. More concretely, any
signer with an established public and private keys can sign message in such a way that
other parties can use the public key to verify that themessage is originated from the signer
who has the keys. A signature scheme is “secure” if no party can force a valid signature
without having the secret key. In [LK14], the formal denition of a digital scheme is as
follows
Denition 4. A signature scheme is a tuple of three probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithms (Gen, Sign,Verify) satisfying the following:
1. e key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs
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a pair of keys (vk, sk). ese are called the public key and the private key, respectively.
We assume for convenience that vk and sk each have length at least κ, and that κ can
be determined from vk, sk.
2. e signing algorithm Sign takes as input a private key sk and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗.
It outputs a signature σ, denoted as σ ← Signsk(m).
3. e deterministic verication algorithm Verify takes as input a public key vkm a mes-
sage m, and a signature σ. It outputs a bit b, with b = 1 meaning valid and b = 0
meaning invalid. We write this as b := Verifyvk(σ,m).
It is required that for every κ, every vk, sk output by Gen(1κ), and every m ∈ {0, 1}∗, it
holds that
Verifyvk(m, Signsk(m)) = 1
If (Gen, Sign,Verify) is such that for every (vk, sk) output by Gen(1κ), algorithm Signsk
is only dened for messages m ∈ {0, 1}`(κ) (and Verifyvk outputs 0 for m 6∈ {0, 1}`(κ), then
we say that (Gen, Sign,Verify) is a signature scheme for messages of length `(n)).
A signature scheme is used as follows: a singer S runs Gen(1κ) to get the public and
private keys (vk, sk). en publicly announce the public key vk belonging to the signer
S. If S needs to send a message m to other party, it computes σ ← Signsk(m) and gives
(m,σ) to the receiver. e receiver knowing the public key vk can verify the authenticity
ofm by checking whether Verifyvk(σ,m) = 1.
Intuitively, we want to ensure that no malicious party can force a valid signature and
message pair without knowing the corresponding secret key. In other words, only the
owner of the key pair can produce the valid signatures. Let Π = (Gen, Sign,Verify) be a
signature scheme. e security of the signature scheme is formally dened as follows.
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Denition 5. A signature schemeΠ = (Gen, Sign,Verify) is existentially unforgeable under
an adaptive chosen-message aack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A,
then there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr[Sig-forceA,Π(κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ)
where the signature experiment Sig-forceA,Π(κ) is dened as follows:
• Gen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (vk, sk).
• AdversaryA is given vk and oracle access to Signsk(·). (is oracle returns a signature
Signsk(m) for any message m of the adversary’s choice.) e adversary then outputs
(m,σ). LetQ denote the set of messages whose signatures were requested byA during
its execution.
• e output of the experiment is dened to be 1 if and only if (1) Verifyvk(m,σ) = 1,
and (2)m 6∈ Q.
Unique signature scheme. Unique signature scheme was introduced in [Lys02],
which consists of four algorithms, a randomized key generation algorithm uKeyGen, a de-
terministic key verication algorithm uKeyVer, a deterministic signing algorithm uSign,
and a deterministic verication algorithm uVerify. We expect for each verication key
there exists only one signing key. We also expect for each pair of message and verica-
tion key, there exists only one signature. We have the following denition.
Denition 6. We say (uKeyGen, uKeyVer, uSign, uVerify) is a strengthened unique signa-
ture scheme, if it satises:
Correctness of key generation: Honestly generated key pair can always be veried. More for-
13
mally, it holds that
Pr
[
(pk, sk)← uKeyGen(1κ) : uKeyVer(pk, sk) = 1
]
≥ 1− negl(κ)
Uniqueness of signing key: ere does not exist two dierent valid signing keys for a veri-
cation key. More formally, for all ppt adversary A, it holds that
Pr
 (pk, sk1, sk2)← A(1κ)
: uKeyVer(pk, sk1) = 1 ∧ uKeyVer(pk, sk1) = 1 ∧ sk1 6= sk2
 ≤ negl(κ)
Correctness of signature generation: For any message x, it holds that
Pr
 (pk, sk)← uKeyGen(1κ);σ := uSign(sk, x)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ) = 1
 ≥ 1− negl(κ)
Uniqueness of signature generation: For all ppt adversary A,
Pr
 (pk, x, σ1, σ2)← A(1κ)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ1) = 1 ∧ uVerify(pk, x, σ2) = 1 ∧ σ1 6= σ2
 ≤ negl(κ)
Unforgeability of signature generation: For all ppt adversary A,
Pr
 (pk, sk)← uKeyGen(1κ); (x, σ)← AuSign(sk,·)(1κ)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ) = 1 ∧ (x, σ) 6∈ Q
 ≤ negl(κ)
where Q is the history of queries that the adversary A made to signing oracle
uSign(sk, ·).
Instantiations for the unique signature scheme. Ecient instantiations can be
found in literature. For example, the well-known BLS signature [BLS01] can be a good
candidate.
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2.1.4 e standard simulation paradigm
We here provide a (tailored) review of the standard simulation paradigm [GMW87].
We remark that this section follows closely Canei’s elegant work [Can00b, Sections 3,4]
but we restrict it in the standalone seing; furthermore, protocol composition has been
excluded since this is not our focus.
2.1.4.1 ITM
For the readers’ convenience, we use the following ITM related denitions from
Canei’s work [Can00b].
Denition 7. An interactive Turing machine (ITM)M is a Turing machine with the follow-
ing augmentations:
Special tapes (i.e., data structures):
• An identity tape. e contents of this tape is interpreted as two strings. e rst string
contains a description, using some standard encoding, of the program ofM (namely,
its transition function). We call this description the code of M . e second string is
called the identity ofM . e identity ofM together with its code is called the extended
identity ofM . is tape is “read only”. at is,M cannot write to this tape.
• An outgoing message tape. Informally, this tape holds the current outgoing message
generated by M, together with sucient addressing information for delivery of the
message.
• ree externally writable tapes for holding inputs coming form other computing devices
(or, processes):
– An input tape, representing inputs from the “calling program(s)” or external user.
– An incoming communication tape, representing information coming from other
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programs within the same “protocol instance”.
– A subroutine output tape, representing outputs coming from programs or modules
that were created as “subroutines” of the present program.
• A one-bit activation tape. Informally, this tape represents whether the ITM is currently
“in execution”.
New instructions:
• An external write instruction. Roughly, the eect of this instruction is that the message
currently wrien on the outgoing message tape is possibly wrien to the specied tape
of the machine with the identity specied in the outgoing message tape.
• A read next message instruction. is instruction species a tape out of { input, incom-
ing communication, subroutine output }. e eect is that the reading head jumps to
the beginning of the next message.
Executing Systems of ITMs. We specify the mechanics of executing a system that
consists of multiple ITMs. However, some signicant dierences from that sketch do
exist. First, here wemake an explicit distinction between an ITM,which is a “static object”,
namely an algorithm or a program, and an ITM instance (ITI), which is a “run-time object”,
namely an instance of a program running on some specic data. In particular, the same
program (ITM) may have multiple instances (ITIs) in an execution of a system.
Second, the model provides a concrete mechanism for addressing ITIs and exchang-
ing information between them. e mechanism species how an addresee is determined,
what information the recipient obtains on the sender, and the computational costs in-
volved.
ird, the model allows the number of ITIs to grow dynamically in an unbounded
way as a function of the initial parameters, by explicitly modeling the “generation” of new
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ITIs. Furthermore, new ITIs may have dynamically determined programs. Here the fact
that programs of ITMs can be represented as strings plays a central role.
Fourth, we augment the executionmodel with a control function, which regulates the
transfer of information between ITIs. Specically, the control function determines which
“external write” instructions are “allowed”. is added construct provides both clarity and
exibility to the execution model: All the model restrictions are expressed explicitly and
in “one place.” Furthermore, it is easy to dene quite dierent execution models simply
by changing the control function.
Writing to a tape of another ITI and invoking new ITIs. e mechanism that al-
lows communication between ITIs is the external write instruction. e same instruction
is used also for invoking new ITIs. More specically, the eect of an external write instruc-
tion is the following. Let µ = (M, id) denote the ITI which performs the external write
transition, e current contents of the outgoing message tape is interpreted (using some
standard encoding) as consisting of µ, followed by an extended identity µ′ = (M ′, id′) of
a “target ITI”, a tape name out of {input, incoming communication, subroutine output },
and a string m called the message. en:
1. If the control function C, applied to the current execution prex, does not allow µ to
write to the specied tape of µ′ (i.e., it returns a disallow value) then the instruction
is ignored.
2. If C allows the operation, and an ITI µ′′ = (M ′′; id′′) with identity id′′ = id′ cur-
rently exists in the system (namely, one of the past congurations in the current
execution prex has identity id′), then:
(a) If the target tape is the incoming communication tape, then the message m is
wrien on the incoming communication tape of µ′′, starting at the next blank
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space. (at is, a new conguration of µ′′ is generated. is conguration is
the last conguration of µ′′ in this execution, with the new informationwrien
on the incoming communication tape.) It is stressed that the code M ′′ of µ′′
need not equal the codeM ′ specied in the external write request.
is convention has the eect that an ITI does not necessarily know the code
of the ITI it sends messages to using the communication tape. e recipient
ITI learns neither the identity nor the code of the writing ITI. (Of course, this
information may be included in the message itself, but the model provides no
guarantees regarding the authenticity of this information.) e intuitive goal
is to capture the eect of standard communication over an untrusted medium,
such as a communication network.
(b) If the target tape is the input tape or subroutine output tape, andM ′′ = M ′,
then the specied message is copied to the specied tape of µ′′, along with
the code and identity of µ. IfM ′ 6= M ′′ then the message is not copied and µ
transitions to a special error state.
is convention has the eect that an ITI can verify the code of the ITI to
whom it provides input or subroutine output. Furthermore, the recipient of an
input or subroutine output knows both the identity and the code of the writing
ITI. e intuitive goal here is to capture the eect of communication between
processes within a trusted computing environment that allows verication of
the code of receiver and sender.
3. If C allows the operation, and no ITI with identity id′ exists in the system, then a
new ITI µ′ with code M ′ and identity id′ is invoked. at is, a new conguration
is generated, with code M ′, the value id′ wrien on the identity tape, and a su-
ciently long random string is wrien on the random input tape. Once the new ITI
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is invoked, the external-write instruction is carried out as in Step 2. In this case, we
say that µ invoked µ′.
2.1.4.2 Simulation paradigm
e basic model of execution. Following [Can01; Can00b], a protocol is represented
as interactive Turing machines (ITMs), each of which represents the program to be run by
a participant. Specically, an ITM has several tapes that can be wrien to by other ITMs:
the input and output tapes model the inputs from and the outputs to “father” programs or
I/O callers, the incoming communication tapes and outgoing communication tapes model
messages received from and to be sent to the network. It also has an identity tape that
cannot be wrien to by the ITM itself. e identity tape contains the program of the
ITM (in some standard encoding) plus additional identifying information specied below.
Adversarial entities are also modeled as ITMs.
We distinguish between ITMs (which represent static objects, or programs) and in-
stances of ITMs, or ITIs, that represent interacting processes in a running system. Speci-
cally, an ITI is an ITM along with an identier that distinguishes it from other ITIs in the
same system. Since we consider a single session, the identier only consists of a party
identier (PID) that distinguishes among the parties in a protocol instance. Typically the
PID is also used to associate ITIs with “parties”, or clusters, that represent some adminis-
trative domains or physical computers.
e model of computation consists of a number of ITIs that can write on each other’s
tapes in certain ways (specied in the model). e identier PID is a unique identier of
the ITI in the system. With one exception (discussed within) we assume that all ITMs are
probabilistic polynomial time.
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Dening security of protocols. Protocols that securely carry out a given task are de-
ned in three steps, as follows. First, the process of executing a protocol in an adversarial
environment is formalized. Next, an “ideal process” for carrying out the task at hand is
formalized. e parties have access to an “ideal functionality,” which is essentially an in-
corruptible “trusted party” that is programmed to capture the desired functionality of the
task at hand. A protocol is said to securely realize an ideal functionality if the process of
running the protocol amounts to “emulating” the ideal process for that ideal functional-
ity. Below we overview the model of protocol execution (called the real-world model), the
ideal process, and the notion of protocol emulation.
emodel for protocol execution. emodel of computation consists of the parties
running an instance of a protocol pi, a network adversaryA that controls the communica-
tion among the parties, and an environment Z that controls the inputs to the parties and
sees their outputs. e execution consists of a sequence of activations,where in each acti-
vation a single participant (eitherZ ,A, or some other ITM) is activated, and may write on
a tape of at most one other participant, subject to the rules below. Once the activation of a
participant is complete (i.e., once it enters a special waiting state), the participant whose
tape was wrien on is activated next. (If no such party exists then the environment is
activated next.)
e environment is given an external input z and is the rst to be activated. In its rst
activation, the environment invokes the adversary A, providing it with some arbitrary
input. e environment can fromnowon invoke (namely, provide input to) only ITMs that
consist of a single instance of protocol pi. at is, all the ITMs invoked by the environment
must have the same SID and the code of pi.
Once the adversary is activated, it may read its own tapes and the outgoing com-
munication tapes of all parties. It may either deliver a message to some party by writing
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this message on the party’s incoming communication tape or report information to Z by
writing this information on the subroutine output tape of Z . For simplicity of exposition,
in the rest of this paper we assume authenticated communication; that is, the adversary
may deliver only messages that were actually sent.
Once a protocol party (i.e., an ITI running pi) is activated, either due to an input
given by the environment or due to a message delivered by the adversary, it follows its
code and possibly writes a local output on the subroutine output tape of the environment,
or an outgoing message on the adversary’s incoming communication tape. e protocol
execution ends when the environment halts. e output of the protocol execution is the
output of the environment. Without loss of generality we assume that this output consists
of only a single bit.
Let REALA,Π,Z(κ, z, r) denote the output of the environment Z when interacting
with parties running protocol pi on security parameter κ, input z and random input
r = rZ , rA, r1, r2, ... as described above (z and rZ for Z ; rA for A, ri for party Pi). Let
REALA,Π,Z(κ, z) denote the random variable describing REALA,Π,Z(κ, z, r)when r is uni-
formly chosen. Let REALA,Π,Z denote the ensemble {REALA,Π,Z(κ, z)}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ .
Remark 1. We note that in the rest of this research, we write EXEC for any execution in-
cluding real or ideal execution.
Ideal functionalities and ideal protocols. Security of protocols is dened via com-
paring the protocol execution to an ideal protocol for carrying out the task at hand. A key
ingredient in the ideal protocol is the ideal functionality that captures the desired func-
tionality, or the specication, of that task. e ideal functionality is modeled as another
ITM (representing a “trusted party”) that interacts with the parties and the adversary.
More specically, in the ideal protocol for functionality F all parties simply hand their
inputs to an ITI running F . (We will simply call this ITI F . In addition, F can interact
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Fig. 1.: Ideal execution (le) and real execution (right) in the standard model
with the adversary according to its code. Whenever F outputs a value to a party, the
party immediately copies this value to its own output tape. We call the parties in the ideal
protocol dummy parties. Let φ denote the ideal protocol for functionality F .
Securely realizing an ideal functionality. We say that a protocol pi emulates proto-
col φ if for any network adversary A there exists an adversary (also known as simulator)
S such that no environment Z , on any input, can tell with non-negligible probability
whether it is interacting with A and parties running pi, or it is interacting with S and
parties running φ. is means that, from the point of view of the environment, running
protocol pi is as good as interacting with φ. We say that pi securely realizes an ideal func-
tionality F if it emulates the corresponding ideal protocol φ. More precise denitions
follow. A distribution ensemble is called binary if it consists of distributions over {0, 1}.
Denition 8. Let pi and φ be protocols. We say that pi emulates φ if for any adver-
sary A there exists an adversary S such that for any standalone environment Z , we have
REALA,Π,Z
c≡ IDEALS,φ,Z .
Denition 9. LetF be an ideal functionality and let pi be a protocol. We say that pi realizes
F if pi emulates the ideal protocol φ.
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2.1.4.3 Ideal functionalities
We here describe some functionalities which can be useful for our protocols in the
body. We also discuss some of their implementations.
Random Oracle Functionality FRO. e random oracle model (e.g., [BR93]) captures
an idealization of a hash function. We here present the random oracle functionality FRO
that has been dened in [HM04].
Functionality FRO
e functionality FRO is parameterized by a security parameter κ, and interacts with a
set P of parties, and an adversary. e functionality keeps a list L (which is initially
empty) of pairs of bitstrings.
1. Upon receiving a value (m) (with m ∈ {0, 1}∗) from some party P ∈ P or from the
adversary, proceed as follows.
• If there is a pair (m, h˜) for some h˜ ∈ {0, 1}κ in the list L,set h := h˜.
• if there is no such pair, choose uniformly h ∈ {0, 1}κ and store the pair (m,h) in
L.
Once h is set, reply to the requesting party with (h).
Fig. 2.: Random oracle functionality FRO.
Multi-Session Signature Functionality FˆuSIG. We present the multi-session version
of the digital signature functionality in [Can03]. While the digital signature function-
ality can be realized by a signature protocol based on ordinary signature scheme, this
functionality here can be realized a signature protocol based on unique signature scheme.
e underlying part highlights the dierence be between ours and that in [Can03]. e
denition of unique signature scheme can be found below.
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Functionality FˆuSIG
e functionality FˆuSIG interacts with a set of signers {S1, . . . , Sk}, and a set of veriers
{V1, . . . , Vn}, and an adversary S .
Key Gerneration: Upon receiving input (Keygen, sid, ssid) from a signer
P ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk}, verify that ssid = (P, ssid′) for some ssid′. If not,
ignore the request. Otherwise, hand (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary, output
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) to the party P .
Signature Generation: Upon receiving input (Sign, sid, ssid,m) from a signer P ∈
{S1, . . . , Sk}, verify that ssid = (P, ssid′) for some ssid′. If not, ignore the re-
quest. Otherwise check if and no (ssid,m, σ, ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, output
(Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ). Otherwise, send (Sign, sid, ssid,m) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(ssid,m, σ, vk, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to P and halt. Oth-
erwise, output (Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ) to P , and record the entry (ssid,m, σ, vk, 1).
Signature Verication: Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, ssid,m, σ, vk′) from some
party P ∈ {V1, . . . , Vn}, hand (Verify, sid, ssid,m, σ, vk′) to the adversary. Upon re-
ceiving (Verified, sid, ssid,m, φ) from the adversary, do:
1. If vk′ = vk and the entry (ssid,m, σ, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
2. Else, if vk′ = vk, the signer of subsession ssid is not corrupted, and no entry
(ssid,m, σ′, vk, 1) for any σ′ is recorded, then set f := 0.
3. Else, if there is an entry (ssid,m, σ, vk′, f ′) recorded, then let f := f ′.
4. Else, let f := φ and record the entry (ssid,m, σ, vk′, φ).
Output (Verified, sid, ssid,m, f) to P .
Fig. 3.: Multi-session signature functionality FˆuSIG.
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2.2 Blockchain technology
2.2.1 Blockchain Notations
As in the original Bitcoin white paper [Nak08], a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain
is created and maintained by a set of players called PoW-miners. A PoW blockchain C
consists of a sequence of ` concatenated PoW-blocks B1‖B2‖ · · · ‖B`, where ` ≥ 0. For
each blockchain, we specify several notations such as head, length, and subchain:
blockchain head, denoted head(C), refers to the topmost block B` in chain C;
blockchain length, denoted len(C), is the number of blocks in blockchain C, and here
len(C) = `;
subchain, refers to a segment of a blockchain; we use C[1, `] to denote an entire
blockchain, and use C[j,m], with j ≥ 1 andm ≤ `, to denote a subchainBj‖ · · · ‖Bm;
in addition, we use C[i] to denote the i-th block Bi in blockchain C; nally, if
blockchain C is a prex of another blockchain C ′, we write C  C ′.
Similar notations can be dened for a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain C˜ which consists of
a sequence of ˜`concatenated PoS-blocks B˜1‖B˜2‖ · · · ‖B˜˜` for ˜`> 0, and is maintained by
a set of players called PoS-holders.
2.2.2 Nakamoto’s blockchain
We here briey review Nakamoto’s Bitcoin blockchain [Nak08]. Bitcoin blockchain
is based on proof-of-work puzzles [DN93; Bac02], which can be abstractly described via
the following hash inequality:
H(hw, ω,X ) < T
where hw ∈ {0, 1}κ is the hash of the previous proof-of-work block (κ is a security pa-
rameter), ω is a suitable solution for this puzzle, X is the record component of the block,
25
and T denotes the current proof-of-work target. See [GKL15] for more details.
Extending the chain. At any point of the protocol execution, each miner aempts to
extend the blockchain. More concretely, upon receiving some record X , a miner chooses
random ω ∈ {0, 1}κ and checks whether ω is a valid solution to the above hash inequality
with respect to hw, hash value of the last block in the blockchain; if so, the miner reveals
the solution to the system. In Nakamoto’s design, multiple miners might nd distinct
solutions with the same preceding block, in which a blockchain fork will be introduced.
To resolve this issue, all well-behaved (honest) miners are expected to follow the longest
blockchain in the system.
Security. Garay et al. [GKL15] and Pass et al. [PSS17a] have already rigorously analyzed
the security of Nakamoto’s blockchain in the cryptographic seing. In a nutshell, the
Nakamoto’s blockchain satises certain important security properties such as common
prex, chain quality and chain growth, under the assumption that the majority of com-
puting power is controlled by honest players.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL
3.1 Modeling blockchain protocol execution
In order to study the security of Bitcoin-like protocol, Garay et al. [GKL15] and then
Pass et al. [PSS17a] set up the rst cryptographic models by following Canei’s formu-
lation of the “real world” executions [Can00a; Can00b]. In this section, we borrow many
ideas from their formulations. We further extend their models so that more blockchain
protocols, e.g., 2-hop blockchains, are allowed.
Network communication. e underlying communication for blockchain protocols are
formulated via a functionality FNET which captures the atomic unauthenticated “send-to-
all” broadcast in an asynchronous communication seing. e functionality is parame-
terized by an upper bound ∆ on the network latency, and interacts with players under
the direction of the adversary. More concretely, the functionality proceeds as follows.
Whenever it receives a message from a player, it would contact the adversary to ask the
adversary to specify the delivery time for the message. Note that, if the specied delivery
time exceeds the delay upper bound∆, the functionality would not follow the adversary’s
instruction, and only delay the message to a maximum number of ∆ rounds. at said, no
messages are delayed more than ∆ rounds. In addition, the adversary could read all mes-
sages sent by all honest players before deciding his strategy; the adversary may “spoof”
the source of amessage they transmit and impersonate the (honest) sender of themessage.
e functionality FNET is formally described in Figure 4.
PoW-miners and PoS-holders. We specify two types of players PoW-miner and
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Functionality FNET
e functionality is parametrized by ∆, and interacts with a set P of PoS-players, and the adver-
sary.
• Upon receiving (Broadcast,m) from a party P where P ∈ P , send (Broadcast,P,m) to S and
record (P,m,D) where D = 1.
• Upon receiving (Delay,m,P′,P′′, t) from S where P′,P′′ ∈ P (here, the adversary can “spoof”
the source of the message), then
– If there is a record (P,m, b) such that D = 1 and if D + t ≤ ∆, then set D := D + t, record
(delay,P′,P′′,m,D)
– Otherwise, ignore the message.
• Upon receiving (Send) from the adversary.
– For all record of form (delay, ·, ·, ·, D), set D := D − 1,
– Check for all record of form (delay, ·, ·, ·, D) such thatD = 0, then send the messages to the
specied receivers in the form.
Fig. 4.: Network functionality FNET.
PoS-holder which correspond to two types of chains, specically, PoW-chain and
PoS-chain; and two types of rounds that execute in turn: PoW-round and PoS-round.
ese two types of chains are tied and grow together (at the same rate.) at said, a
chain-pair including a PoW-chain and a PoS-chain should have two member chains of
the roughly similar length. If the PoW-chain or PoS-chain in this pair grows too fast, this
chain-pair becomes invalid. Note that the PoW-miners and PoS-holders are playing dier-
ent roles in our model; however, without the collaboration of these two types of players,
our model cannot be secure.
In our model, without loss of generality, we assume all PoW-miners have the
same amount of computing power and all PoS-holders have the same amount of stake.
Note that this is an “idealized model”. In the reality, each dierent honest PoW-miner
or PoS-holder may have a dierent amount of computing power/stake; nevertheless,
this idealized model does not sacrice generality since one can imagine that real hon-
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est PoW-miners/PoS-holders are simply clusters of some arbitrary number of honest
idealized-model PoW-miners/PoS-holders. We note that the protocol’s players may never
be certain about the number of participants in the protocol execution, given the unauthen-
ticated nature of the communication model. Moreover, for simplicity, only a standalone
static model is considered in this model, and the number of players is xed during the
course of the protocol execution.
In each PoW-round, PoW-miners have ability proportionally to their computing
power to produce proof-of-work blocks. More concretely, upon receiving messages which
include many chain-pairs from the network, each PoW-miner would choose the best valid
chain-pair, and then utilize his computing power to solve the PoW puzzle in order to
extend the best chain-pair in this round. On the other hand, in each PoS-round, the
PoS-holder with the derived identity from the new PoW-block of the previous PoW-round
is able to generate a new PoS-block, and then appends the new block to the best chain-pair
on his local view. Note that, for each PoS-holder, the probability of being chosen is based
on the amount of stake that party has. e detail of our blockchain execution is presented
below.
e execution of proof-of-work blockchain protocol. Following Canei’s formu-
lation of the “real world” executions [Can00a; Can00b], we present an abstract model
for hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake blockchain protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in the hybrid
model where Πw and Πs denote the code run by PoW-miners and PoS-holders, respec-
tively. We consider the execution of the blockchain protocolΠ = (Πw,Πs) that is directed
by an environmentZ(1κ) (where κ is a security parameter), which activates an n bounded
number of PoW-miners and n˜ bounded number of PoS-holders. e execution proceeds in
rounds. Without loss of generality, we assume that odd rounds correspond to PoW-miners,
and even rounds correspond to PoS-holders. e environment Z can “manage” protocol
players through an adversary A that can adaptively corrupt honest parties.
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Preparation phase. Any active PoW-miners and PoS-holder, before participating in the
mining process, will obtain additional information from the system based on its initial
state. More concretely, PoW-miners and PoS-holder will obtain the entire blockchain in-
formation from the system, and store the blockchain information in its storage.
Execution phase. Any active PoW-miners or PoS-holder can join the mining process
aer the preparation phase. e mining process consists of multiple rounds. In each
round, the environment Z provides inputs for all miners and receives outputs from these
miners, and the miners communicate with each other. More concretely, in each round,
each honest miner receives an input from the environment Z , and potentially receives
incoming network messages (delivered by the adversary A), and then updates its local
storage; then based on the stored information, it carries out some mining operations; in
the case that a new block is generated, the miner sends out the new block via Broadcast()
which will be guaranteed to be delivered to all miners in the beginning of the next round.
Note that, at any point of the execution, the environment Z can communicate with the
adversary A or access the local information of the miners. In addition have ideal access
to an unbounded number of copies of some ideal functionality F .
For simplicity, we consider the static computing power and stake seing (where the
total amount of computing power and stakes invested to the protocol will not change
over time). We consider adaptive adversaries who are allowed to take control of protocol
players on the y. At any point of the execution, Z can send message (Corrupt, P ) to
adversary A. From that point, A has access to the party’s local state and controls P .
Let EXECFΠ,A,Z be a random variable denoting the joint view of all parties (i.e., all
their inputs, random coins and messages received, including those from the random or-
acle and signatures) in the above F-hybrid execution; note that this joint view fully de-
termines the execution. Whenever F are clear from context we oen write EXECΠ,A,Z or
EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z .
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3.2 Modeling proof-of-work
3.2.1 Functionality F∗PoW
In our seing, the PoW-miners have limited ability to produce proofs of work. To cap-
ture this, all PoW-miners are assumed to have access to a physical resource setup F∗PoW
which manages a huge “farm of computing devices” (represented by “nonces”), and these
devices are provided by the environment Z through the adversary. In order to utilize the
computing power of the functionality, each player needs to register the computing ser-
vices of F∗PoW or disconnect the services at some later points. Indeed, this captures the
dynamic computing power seing where dierent players could consume the computing
resource for dierent windows of time. Functionality F∗PoW abstracts out the Bitcoin like
mining process; this will simplify the design and analysis of protocols based on such min-
ing ecosystem. Here, each PoW-miner is able to request one search query from F∗PoW that
consumes one unit of computing power granted in each execution round. en the player
can only nd it with a certain probability p. Besides the computing services, the setup
also provides the verication services which allow any player to verify solutions in many
times. Please refer to Figure 5 for more details.
As discussed above, this is an “idealized” interpretation of the seingwhere all miners
have the same amount of computing power; nevertheless, this idealized model does not
sacrice generality. e adversary A is allowed to perform at most t queries per round,
where t is the number of corrupted PoW-miners. us, the computing power is consumed
by querying the functionality in a bounded number of times.
We remark that we are not the rst to formulate the setup of computing resources.
Earlier eorts can be found in [KMS14; PSS17a]. We argue that, our F∗PoW formulation is
more rigorous than the previous eorts; we explicitly model how the computing resource
is managed and distributed from the environment to parties. In our model, each party can
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Functionality F∗PoW
e functionality is parameterized by a PoW parameter p, a PoW security parameter κ, and in-
teracts with PoW-miners {W1, . . . ,Wn}, PoS-holders {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}, as well as an adversary S .
1. Computing Resource Registration. Upon receiving a message (Work-Register,Wi) from
party Wi ∈ {W1, . . . ,Wn}, pass the message to the adversary. Upon receiving a message
(Work-Registered,Wi, ω) from the adversary, record (Wi, ω), and pass ω to the party Wi (the
partyWi registered.)
2. Work ery. Upon receiving (Search, ω, context) from a PoW-miner Wi or from the adversary
where ω ∈ {0, 1}κ, proceed as follows.
(a) If there is record (·, 〈context , ω〉, bwi ), then send (Searched,Wi, bwi ) to the player.
(b) Otherwise, check If (Wi, ω) is not recorded, then ignore the message. Otherwise, if (Wi, ω)
is recorded (the partyWi registered and granted one unit of computational resource), then
delete the record (Wi, ω), and process the following.
• with probability p, set bwi := 1, (the partyWi discovers the solution,)
• with probability 1− p, set bwi := 0. (the partyWi does not discover the solution.)
en record (Wi, 〈context , ω〉, bwi ). en send (Searched,Wi, bwi ) to the playerWi
3. Work Verication ery. Upon receiving (RO-Verify, context , ω) from a party P where P ∈
{W1, . . . ,Wn, Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} or from the adversary, check if there exists a recorded entry
(·, 〈context , ω〉, bwi ) then send (RO-Verified, bwi ) to the party P . Otherwise, output error.
Fig. 5.: Proof-of-work functionality F∗PoW.
register and receive the computing resource represented by nonce ω under the control of
the environment. at said, this model naturally captures the joining of new players or
the rejoining of old players.
Furthermore, our F∗PoW is closely related to, but dierent from FTree in [PSS17a] and
FStX [Bad+17] . In [PSS17a], a “per protocol” approach is taken. at is, for dierent
blockchain protocol, say GHOST protocol [SZ15], a dierent variant of FTree should be
dened. We take a dierent approach; we abstract the essence of the underlying resources,
and our proof-of-work functionalityF∗PoW can be used for dierent PoW-based blockchain
protocols, and we do not need to revise the setup per protocol. Similar to FTree and ours,
In [Bad+17], the functionality FStX abstracts out the election process where messages are
accepted with a certain probability. However, FStX additionally checks the validity of the
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“input messages“ (“context“ in our functionality) with respect to the historical state. On
the other hand, ourF∗PoW only captures the proof-of-workminingmechanism, the validity
of the context is not covered. is demonstrates the purpose of our model. Specically,
we want to abstract the proof-of-work mechanism or how players nd the solutions for
puzzles only. is F∗PoW can be used to analyze any PoW-based blockchain protocols.
3.2.2 Implementing F∗PoW in FRO-hybrid model
As discussed in section 3.2.1, the functionality F∗PoW is implemented by a random
oracle functionality FRO [HM04]. We denote φ∗PoW as the ideal protocol for an ideal func-
tionality F∗PoW and piPoW as the protocol in the FRO-hybrid model. In the ideal protocol
φ∗PoW, players are dummy since they just forward the messages received from the envi-
ronment Z to the functionality F∗PoW, and then forward the messages received from the
functionality to the environment. On the other hand, upon receiving messages from the
environment, the players in piPoW execute the protocol and then pass the outputs to the
environment. Note that, we allow each PoW-miner to receive only one unit of computing
power (one chance of querying the random oracle) per round.
Essentially, protocol piPoW captures the core of PoW-based blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin).
Informally, piPoW carries out the following two main steps: rst, each PoW-miner is
able to“mine” for a puzzle solution of a hash inequality; aer that, any other players
(PoW-miners or PoS-holders) can verify the found solution. e formal description of
protocol piPoW is given in Figure 6.
LetS be the adversary against the ideal protocolφ∗PoW, andA be the adversary against
the hybrid protocol piPoW. We now show that piPoW is as “ secure” as φ∗PoW with respect
to the adversary S . Let EXECFROpiPoW,A,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view
of all parties in the execution of piPoW with the adversary A and an environment Z . In
addition, let EXECF
∗
PoW
φ∗PoW,S,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view of all parties in
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Protocol piPoW
e protocol is parameterized by a PoW parameter p and a security parameter κ.
Each PoW-minerWi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, proceeds as follows.
1. Upon receiving (Work-Register,Wi) from the environment Z , if (Wi, ω) is already recorded,
then ignore the message. Otherwise, choose ω ∈ {0, 1}κ, record (Wi, ω), and pass the message
(Work-Registered,Wi, ω) to the environment.
2. Upon receiving (Search,Wi, context) from the environment Z , if recored ω, then query the func-
tionality FRO on input B = (context , ω) and then obtain output h . If h ≤ T where T = p · 2κ, set
bwi := 1. Otherwise, if h > T, set bwi := 0 send (Searched,Wi, bwi ) to the environment.
Each player P ∈ {W1, . . . ,Wn, Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} proceeds as follows. Upon receiving
(RO-Verify, context , ω) from the environment Z , send (context , ω) to the functionality FRO
and receive h . If h ≤ T, set bwi =:= 1. Otherwise, if h > T, set bwi := 0. en send
(RO-Verified, bwi ) to the environment.
Fig. 6.: Proof-of-work protocol piPoW.
the execution of φ∗PoW with the adversary S and an environment Z .
Lemma 1. Consider protocol piPoW in Figure 6 and the ideal protocol φ∗PoW described above.
Assume pn  1, where p is a PoW parameter and n is the total number of PoW-miners. It
holds that the two ensembles EXECFROpiPoW,A,Z and EXEC
F∗PoW
φ∗PoW,S,Z are perfectly indistinguish-
able.
Proof. We show that the two executions are perfectly close by the following simulation.
Consider the adversary A for piPoW, we now construct an adversary S on input 1κ and a
PoW parameter p for φ∗PoW as follows. Note that, the adversary S stores a table T .
1. Upon receiving (Work-Register,Wi) from the functionality F∗PoW for honest par-
ties, choose random ω ← {0, 1}κ, then send (Work-Registered,Wi, ω) to F∗PoW.
For corrupted parties, wait to receive (context , ω) when the corrupted parties (con-
trolled by A) query FRO and set the nonce.
2. Upon receiving (context , ω) from any partyWi (corrupted or uncorrupted), if there
is a record ((context , ω), bwi , h) in T , then send h to Wi. Otherwise, if there is no
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record ((context , ω), bwi ), send (Search, ω, context) to F∗PoW and
Upon receiving (Searched,Wi, bwi ) from F∗PoW. if bwi = 1 choose random h ∈
{0, 1}κ such that h ≤ T. Otherwise if bwi = 0 choose random h ∈ {0, 1}κ such that
h > T where T = p · 2κ. en record ((context , ω), bwi , h). and then send h toWi
Since there are no interactions with the adversary A or corrupted parties in regis-
tration phase and verication query phase, the simulator does not need to simulate
these phases.
We demonstrate that EXECFROpiPoW,A,Z and EXEC
F∗PoW
φ∗PoW,S,Z are perfectly indistinguishable. is
is done by showing that the joint view of all parties in the execution of piPoW with adver-
saryA and environmentZ is perfectly indistinguishable from the joint view of all parties
in the execution of φ∗PoW with S and Z . We can easily see that (1) each random oracle
query fromA is sampled uniformly at random from a set {0, 1}κ, and (2) each work query,
or verication query to F∗PoW is also sampled uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}κ.
erefore, the two ensembles EXECFROpiPoW,A,Z and EXEC
F∗PoW
φ∗PoW,S,Z are perfectly close.
3.3 Modeling proof-of-stake
3.3.1 Unpredictable unique signature functionality FuuSIG
e usual unique signature functionality is too weak for proof-of-stake related pro-
posals since the adversary can see the distribution of signatures and predict future elec-
tion. us, we need the unpredictability of the signature scheme. is is formalized via
the unpredictable unique signature scheme in Figure 7
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Functionality FuuSIG
e functionalityFuuSIG interacts with a set of signers {S1, . . . , Sk}, and a set of veriers
{V1, . . . , Vn}, and an adversary S .
1. Key Gerneration: Upon receiving input (Keygen, sid, ssid) from a signer
P ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk}, verify that ssid = (P, ssid′) for some ssid′. If not,
ignore the request. Otherwise, hand (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary, output
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) to the party P .
2. Signature Generation: Upon receiving input (Sign, sid, ssid,m) from a signer P ∈
{S1, . . . , Sk}, verify that ssid = (P, ssid′) for some ssid′. If not, ignore the re-
quest. Otherwise check if and no (ssid,m, σ, ·, ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, output
(Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ, h). Otherwise, send (Sign, sid, ssid,m) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(ssid,m, σ, ·, vk, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to P and halt.
Otherwise, choose random h ∈ {0, 1}κ and output (Signature, sid, ssid,m, σ, h) to P ,
and record the entry (ssid,m, σ, h, vk, 1).
3. Signature Verication: Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, ssid,m, σ, h, vk′) from
some party P ∈ {V1, . . . , Vn}, hand (Verify, sid, ssid,m, σ, vk′) to the adversary. Upon
receiving (Verified, sid, ssid,m, φ) from the adversary, do:
(a) If vk′ = vk and the entry (ssid,m, σ, h, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
(b) Else, if vk′ = vk, the signer of subsession ssid is not corrupted, and no entry
(ssid,m, σ′, vk, 1) for any σ′ is recorded, then set f := 0.
(c) Else, if there is an entry (ssid,m, σ, vk′, f ′) recorded, then let f := f ′.
(d) Else, let f := φ and record the entry (ssid,m, σ, vk′, φ).
Output (Verified, sid, ssid,m, f) to P .
Fig. 7.: Unpredictable unique signature functionality FuuSIG.
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3.3.2 Functionality F∗PoS
In this subsection, we introduce our proof-of-stake functionality F∗PoS describing the
usage of virtual resource in our system. Please refer to Figure 8 for more details.
Similar to the proof-of-work functionality F∗PoW, the proof-of-stake functionality are
introduced to capture the leader election process via the virtual resource, i.e., stakes. Intu-
itively, players having stakewill have a certain chance (with probability p˜) of being elected
as the leader. is guarantees that the more stakes players have, the beer chances of be-
ing elected.
3.3.3 Implementing F∗PoS in {FuuSIG,FRO}-hybrid model
We denote φ∗PoS as the ideal protocol for an ideal functionality F∗PoS, and piPoS as pro-
tocol in the {FuuSIG,FRO}-hybrid model. In the ideal protocol φ∗PoS, the dummy players
only forward the messages received from the environment to the functionality F∗PoS, and
then forward the messages received from the functionality to the environment. Infor-
mally, each PoS-holder through his stake determines whether he is the elected leader in
the current round or not; then he is able to generate a valid signature, which can later be
veried by any other players. e protocol piPoS is formally described in Figure 9.
Let S be the adversary against the ideal protocol φ∗PoS, and A be the adversary
against protocol piPoS. Let EXEC
F∗PoS
φ∗PoS,S,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view
of all parties in the execution of φ∗PoS with the adversary S and an environment Z . Let
EXECFuuSIG,FROpiPoS,A,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view of all parties in the execu-
tion of piPoS with the adversary A and an environment Z .
Lemma 2. Consider φ∗PoS described above and piPoS in Figure 9. Assume p˜n˜  1, where p˜
is a PoS parameter and n˜ is the total number of PoS-holders. It holds that the two ensembles
EXEC
F∗PoS
φ∗PoS,S,Z and EXEC
FuuSIG,FRO
piPoS,A,Z are perfectly indistinguishable.
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Functionality F∗PoS
e functionality is parameterized by a PoS parameter p˜, a security parameter κ, and interacts
with PoW-miners {W1, . . . ,Wn}, PoS-holders {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}, as well as an adversary S .
1. Stake Resource Registration.
Upon receiving a message (Stake-Register, Sj) from party Sj ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}, if there is an
entry (Sj , 1), then ignore the message. Otherwise, pass the message to the adversary. Upon
receiving a message (Stake-Registered, Sj , vk) from the adversary, record (Sj , vk), and pass vk to
the party Sj (the party Sj registered.)
2. Stake Election: Upon receiving (Elect, vk, context) from a PoS-holder Sj , proceed as follows.
If (Sj , vk) is not recorded, then ignore the message. Otherwise, proceed the following.
• If (Elect, context , Sj , ω˜, vk, bsj) has been recored, send (Elected, Sj , ω˜, bsj) to Sj
• Otherwise,
– if (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, ·) has been recorded, then ignore the input.
– Otherwise, send (Elect-Sign, Sj , context) to the adversary. Upon receiv-
ing (Elect-Signed, Sj , context , ω˜) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message (Error) to
Sj and halt. Else, record the entry (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, 1).
en
– with probability p˜, set bsj := 1 and send (Elected, Sj , ω˜, bsj) to Sj . (the party Sj is
elected.)
– with probability 1 − p˜, set bsj := 0 and send (Elected, Sj , ω˜, bsj) to Sj (the party Sj is
not elected.)
and record the entry (Elect, context , Sj , ω˜, vk, bsj).
3. Stake Verication: Upon receiving (Stake-Verify, (Sj , context), ω˜, vk) from a party P ∈
{W1, . . . ,Wn, Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} or from the adversary,
(a) If there exists a record of the form (Elect, context , Sj , ω˜, vk, bsj) where bsj = 1 (the party
Sj is elected), hand (Stake-Verify, (Sj , context), ω˜, vk) to the adversary. Upon receiving
(Stake-Verified, (Sj , context , ω˜), φ) from the adversary, do:
• If (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
• Else, if Sj is not corrupted, and no entry (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜′, vk, 1) for any ω˜′ is
recorded, then set f := 0 and record the entry (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, vk, f)
• Else, if there is an entry (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, vk, f ′), then set f := f ′.
• Else, set f := φ, and record the entry (Sign, Sj , context , ω˜, vk, f).
Output (Stake-Verified, (Sj , context), f) to the party P .
(b) Otherwise, if there is no record of the form (Elect, context , Sj , ω˜, vk) (the party Sj is not
elected), set f := 0, and output (Stake-Verified, (Sj , context), f) to the party P .
Fig. 8.: Proof-of-stake functionality F∗PoS.
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Protocol piPoS
e protocol is parameterized by a PoS parameter p˜ and a security parameter κ.
Each S ∈ P0, proceeds as follows.
1. Upon receiving (Stake-Register, S) from the environment, pass (Keygen, sid, ssid) for some
sid, ssid where ssid = (S, ssid′) for some ssid′ to the functionality FuuSIG. Upon receiving
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from FˆuSIG, record (S, vk). en send vk to the environment.
2. Upon receiving (Elect, S, context) from the environment Z , send (Sign, sid, ssid, S, context) to the
functionality FuuSIG.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, (S, context), ω˜, h) from FuuSIG, send (context , vk, ω˜, h) to the
functionality FRO and receives h˜puzz.
• If h˜puzz > T where T = p˜ · 2κ, then set bs := 0.
• Else, set bs := 1.
Send (Elected, S, ω˜, bs) to the environment.
3. Upon receiving (Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜, h, vk) from the environment Z , then
send (Verify, sid, ssid, S, context , ω˜, h, vk) to the functionality FuuSIG. Upon receiving
(Verified, sid, ssid, (S, context), f) from the functionality FuuSIG. If f = 1, send (context , vk, ω˜, h)
to the functionality FRO and receives h˜puzz.
• If h˜puzz > T where T = p˜ · 2κ, then set f := 0.
• Else, set f := 1.
send (Stake-Verified, (S, context), f) to the environment.
Fig. 9.: Proof-of-stake protocol piPoS.
Proof. We show that the two executions are perfectly indistinguishable by the following
simulation. Consider the adversaryA for piPoS, we now construct an adversary S on input
1κ and a PoS parameter p˜ for φ∗PoS as follows. S stores a table T
Initialization and Stake Election:
1. Simulating the execution with an uncorrupted party S as follows. When S receives
in the ideal process a message (Stake-Verified,P, context , ω˜) from F∗PoS, where S
is uncorrupted, it proceeds as follows:
If this is the rst time that S generates a signature, then simulate for A the process
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of key generation . at is, send to A (in the name of FuuSIG) (Keygen, sid, ssid)
to the adversary, and receive (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adver-
sary A, then send (Register, sid, ssid, vk) to the adversary A; upon receiving
(Registered, sid, ssid) from the adversary, then record the pair (ssid, vk).
2. Simulating the execution with a corrupted party S with FuuSIG as follows.
(a) Upon receiving (Keygen, sid, ssid) from party S, send to A (in the
name of FuuSIG) (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary, and receive
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary A, then send
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) (in the name of FuuSIG) to S and record
(ssid, S, vk).
(b) Upon receiving (Sign, sid, ssid, S, context) from party S, check if no
(ssid, context , ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, ignore the request. Otherwise,
send (Sign, sid, ssid, context) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, context , ω˜) from the adversary, choose
random h ∈ {0, 1}κ, output (Signature, sid, ssid, context , ω˜, h) to S, and
record the entry (ssid, context , ω˜, h, vk, 1).
(c) en, instruct the corrupted party S send the message (Elect, S, context , vk)
to F∗PoS.
Upon receiving (Sign, sid, ssid, context) from F∗PoS, send
(Signature, sid, ssid, context , (ω˜, h)) to F∗PoS.
3. Simulate the interaction of any party S with FRO as follows.
For query (context , vk, ω˜, h) from party S, send (Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜) to
F∗PoS and receive (Stake-Verified, (S, context), ω˜, f). If f = 0, choose random
h˜puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ such that h˜puzz > Twhere T = p˜ ·2κ. If f = 1, choose h˜puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ
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such that h˜puzz ≤ T. en store ((context , vk, ω˜, h), h˜puzz)) in the table T and send
h˜puzz to S.
Block Verication:
1. Simulating the execution with an uncorrupted party S as follows. When notied by
F∗PoS that some uncorrupted party Smade a verication request, proceed as follows.
Upon receiving message (Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜, vk) from F∗PoS, then forward
message (Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜, h, vk) (h is recored with context and ω˜ by S
above) to A (in the name of FuuSIG). Forward A’s response back to F∗PoS.
2. Simulating the execution with a corrupted party S with FˆuSIG as follows.
(a) Instruct the corrupted party S send the message
(Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜, vk) to F∗PoS.
(b) Upon receiving (Verify, sid, ssid, S, context , ω˜, h, vk) from a corrupted party
S, generate a response following the instructions of FuuSIG.
3. Simulate the interaction of any party S with FRO as follows.
For query (context , vk, ω˜, h) from party S check if ((context , vk, ω˜, h), h˜puzz))
in the table T and send h˜puzz to S. otherwise, send
(context , vk, ω˜), send (Stake-Verify, S, context , ω˜) to F∗PoS and receive
(Stake-Verified(S, context), ω˜, f). If f = 0, choose random h˜puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ
such that h˜puzz > T where T = p˜ · 2κ. If f = 1, choose h˜puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ such that
h˜puzz ≤ T. en store ((hprev, r, vk, ω˜), h˜puzz)) in the table T and send h˜puzz to S.
We now show that the two ensembles EXECF
∗
PoS
φ∗PoS,S,Z and EXEC
FˆuSIG,FRO
piPoS,A,Z are perfectly
close. Notice that for each election query, the adversary S is noticed by the functionality
F∗PoS whether this query is successful or not, then it samples the output randomly from
a set {0, 1}κ that satised inequality H(context , vk, ω˜, h) ≤ T˜ if the query is successful.
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Puing them together, the views of players in the two executions are perfectly indistin-
guishable.
3.3.4 Blockchain security properties
Previously, several fundamental security properties for 1-hop blockchain protocols
have been dened: common prex property [GKL15; PSS17a], chain quality property
[GKL15], and chain growth property [KP15]. Intuitively, the chain growth property states
that the chains of honest players should grow linearly to the number of rounds. e com-
mon prex property indicates the consistency of any two honest chains except the last κ
blocks. e chain quality property, aims at expressing the number of honest blocks’ con-
tributions that are contained in a suciently long and continuous part of an honest chain.
Specically, for parameters ` ∈ N and µ ∈ (0, 1), the ratio of honest input contributions
in a continuous part of an honest chain has a lower bounded µ.
We follow the same spirit to dene the security properties for our 2-hop blockchain
protocol. Since each valid PoS-chain and PoW-chain exist in our system as a pair having
the same structure and grow at the same rate, we focus on the common prex, chain
quality, and chain growth properties for the PoS-chain. e denitions for these properties
are formally given as follows.
Denition 10 (Chain growth). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. e chain growth
property Qcg with parameter g ∈ R, states that for any honest PoS-holder S ∈
{Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜ ′ in round r′ where r′− r > 0,
in EXECΠ,A,Z . It holds that len(C˜ ′)− len(C˜) ≥ g · (r′ − r)
Denition 11 (Common prex). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. e common prex
property Qcp with parameter κ ∈ N states that for any two honest PoS-holders Si in round
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r and Sj in round r′ with the local PoS-chains C˜i, C˜j , respectively, in EXECΠ,A,Z where
i, j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , n+ n˜}, r ≤ r′, it holds that C˜i[1, `i]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ).
Denition 12 (Chain quality). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. e chain quality
property Qcq with parameters µ ∈ R and ` ∈ N states that for any honest PoS-holder
S ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} with PoS-chain C˜ in EXECΠ,A,Z , it holds that for large enough `
consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ the ratio of honest blocks is at least µ.
We note that, the chain growth and common prex for the PoW-chains would be
implied from the PoS-chain except the chain quality property since the adversary could
be able to aach more malicious PoW-blocks to the PoW-chain in case he controls the
majority of computing power.
New property: Chain soundness. We here introduce a new security property, chain
soundness, which is critical for blockchain protocols in the open seing. A good protocol
in the open network environment, should ensure honest new players to join the system
securely. Intuitively, the protocol can help the new players to obtain a blockchain which is
compatible with the local chain of an existing honest player in some recent rounds. While
this property is not needed for protocols in the closed seing where new players are not
allowed, it is important for blockchains in the open network environments. Without this
security requirement, unsatisfactory protocols could be allowed. e chain soundness
property can be described as follows.
Denition 13 (Chain soundness). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π with a set P of
players. Consider a new player Pi ∈ P with best local chain C˜i in round r, in EXECΠ,A,Z .
e chain soundness propertyQcs states the following: for the new playerPi and any existing
players Pj with best local chain C˜j at round r we have that C˜i[¬κ]  C˜j and C˜j[¬κ]  C˜i.
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CHAPTER 4
INITIAL DESIGN AND PROVABLE SECURITY: 2-HOP BLOCKCHAIN
In this chapter, we propose a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake protocol. In our design,
as argued above, we (intend to) use both physical resources and virtual resources. at
means, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players — PoS-holder (stakeholder) —
is introduced in our system. Now a winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain
immediately. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder
to be “selected” to extend the blockchain. In short, in our system, a PoW-miner and then a
PoS-holder jointly extend the blockchain with a new block. If Nakamoto’s consensus can
be viewed as a 1-hop protocol, then ours is a 2-hop protocol.
4.1 2-hop design
We rst give the high-level description of our 2-hop blockchain design in Sec-
tion 4.1.1; then in Section 4.1.2, we formally present our main protocol; the process of
choosing the best valid chain-pair among a set of chain-pairs can be found in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 High-level description
Nakamoto’s system is powered by physical computing resources and secure against
fully adaptive adversary who can corrupt participants at any moment. e blockchain is
maintained by PoW-miners; there, each winning PoW-miner can extend the blockchain
with a new block. In our design, as argued above, we (intend to) use both physical re-
sources and virtual resources to achieve the same level of security— adaptive security.
at means, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players — PoS-holder (stakeholder)
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— is introduced in our system. Now a winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain
immediately. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder
to be “selected” to extend the blockchain. In short, in our system, a PoW-miner and then a
PoS-holder jointly extend the blockchain with a new block. If Nakamoto’s consensus can
be viewed as a 1-hop protocol, then ours is a 2-hop protocol.
A pictorial illustration of our 2-hop blockchain structure can be found in Figure 10:
red blocks are generated by PoW-miners in the rst hops, while green blocks are pro-
duced by PoS-holders in the second hops; now naturally a PoW-chain consists the se-
quence of red blocks B1, B2, B3, · · · , and a PoS-chain consists the sequence of green
blocks B˜1, B˜2, B˜3, · · · . In fact, our 2-hop blockchain is bootstrapped from an “already
mature” blockchain denote as B−N . . . , B−1, B0 for an integer N ; see the dark blocks in
the gure.
Rounds
B−1 B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
B˜1 B˜2 B˜3 B˜4
. . .
. . .
. . .
Fig. 10.: 2-hop blockchain structure
Here, dot arrows denote the rst hops, and solid arrows denote the second hops. Red blocks Bi’s
denote the proof-of-work blocks, and green blocks B˜i’s denote the corresponding proof-of-stake
blocks. Note that the dark-red blocks are from the “mature blockchain”.
In our scheme, there are two types of nodes, called miners and stakeholders (users).
Correspondingly, there are two types of chains: proof-of-work chain (PoW-chain), de-
noted C, and proof-of-stake chain (PoS-chain), denoted C˜, in the system. ese PoW/PoS
chains are securely tied together, as a chain-pair. Stakeholdersmaintain the proof-of-stake
chain. On the other hand, miners together manage the proof-of-work chain which is con-
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sidered as a biased random beacon for choosing stakeholder (to extend the proof-of-stake
chain).
• Extending the PoW-chain: To generate a new PoW-block, each miner rst computes
the hash hw ∈ {0, 1}κ of the previous PoW-block (the head of the PoW-chain), the
hash hs ∈ {0, 1}κ of the head of the PoS-chain. To be noted that, the PoW chain and
PoS chain must have same length in a valid chain pair. e miner then aempts to
solve the following hash inequality
H(hw, hs, ω) < T
by nding a suitable solution ω where T denotes the current proof-of-work target.
PoW-block B is in the form B = 〈hw, hs, ω〉.
If the miner succeeds in nding the proper ω, he then generates a new PoW-block
which includes the hash values hw, hs and the solution ω, and shares this PoW-block
to other players in the network.
• Extending the PoS-chain: In our design, each PoS player holds two pairs of
keys (vk, sk) and (vk′, sk′) for digital signature schemes (Gen, Sign,Verify) and
(Gen′, Sign′,Verify′), respectively. Here (Gen, Sign,Verify) is a unique digital signa-
ture scheme, while (Gen′, Sign′,Verify′) can be an ordinary digital signature scheme.
We note that, in our design, each PoW-block is used for selecting new stakeholders
(to generate new PoS blocks). More concretely, if there is a new PoW block B in
the system, any stakeholder whose verication key vk satises the following hash
inequality
H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜
is allowed to generate a new PoS block, where T˜ is the current proof-of-stake target,
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hw is the hash value of B and ω˜ ← Signsk(B).
PoS-block B˜ is in the form B˜ = 〈(B, ω˜, vk),X , σ, vk′〉, whereX ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
the payload of the proof-of-stake block B˜ (also denoted as payload(B˜)); and σ is
produced by the PoS player but by using a dierent signing key sk′, i.e., σ ←
Sign′sk′((B, ω˜, vk),X ).
We emphasize again that (Gen, Sign,Verify) is a unique signature scheme, which is
critical for our design.
4.1.2 e main protocol
2-hop blockchain. It is important to note that in the Nakamoto PoW-based blockchain,
the assumption to secure the system is that malicious miners control less than the half of
computing power since if so they can fork a valid blockchain which breaks the consensus
of the blockchain protocol. In our system, in order to secure against such aack, we need
to combine two dierent resources: physical resource (i.e., computing power) and vir-
tual resource (i.e., stake). Sequentially, we have two types of blockchains (PoW-chain and
PoS-chain) corresponding to two types of rounds — PoW-round and PoS-round executing
in turn —making 2-hop blockchain. Note that, in reality, one player could play both roles,
PoW-miner and PoS-holder; however, without loss of generality, we treat the two roles
separately. In order to tie them hard, the scheme maps each PoW-block to no more than
1 stakeholder. Only the stakeholder who has the privilege is able to generate the corre-
sponding PoS-block of each PoW-block. Note that PoW-chains and PoS-chains existing in
our system are represented as pairs, and each player locally stores a chain-pair. erefore,
the two member chains of each valid chain-pairs should have the same structure.
We now present our main protocol that describes the behaviour of PoW-miners and
PoS-holders. e PoW and PoS executions vary slightly. On one hand, in the PoW execu-
tion, PoW-miners search for proof-of-work solutions via F∗PoW. On the other hand, in the
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PoS execution, PoS-holders follow the growth of the PoW-chain and use that to extend
the PoS-chain via F∗PoS. In general, PoW-miners and PoS-holders collect blockchain in-
formation from the network functionality FNET, perform some validation and generating
blocks, and then share their states with the network through FNET.
e protocol Π is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·), which de-
termines the proper structure of the information that is stored into the blockchain as in
[GKL15; PSS17a]. Initialization of each party’s execution sets the round clock to zero and
sets the local chain-pair 〈Ci, C˜i〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + n˜ (n is the number of PoW-miners and
n˜ is the number of PoS-holders), such that Ci := Cinit, C˜i := C˜init, where Cinit is our initial
blockchain, i.e., Cinit = B−N‖ . . . ‖B−1‖B0, C˜init = 0‖ . . . ‖0‖0, and len(Cinit) = len(C˜init).
We assume at the beginning of the protocol execution, a set of PoS-holders are al-
ready registered. e registration information are included in Cinit. We emphasize that
new players may be registered later during the execution. e new registration informa-
tion will be included in the payload of the following PoS blocks.
Please refer to Figure 11 for more details of our main protocol.
4.1.3 e best chain-pair strategy
In this subsection, we describe the rules in which a single valid chain-pair is selected
for consensus. Roughly speaking, a chain-pair is the best valid pair if it has the longest
valid PoW-chain. We introduce process BestValid, which is run locally by PoW-miners
or PoS-holders, to select the best chain-pair. e BestValid process is parameterized by
a content validation predicate V (·) and an initial chain Cinit where V (·) determines the
proper structure of the information that is stored into the blockchain as in [GKL15], and
takes as input chain-pair set C′. Intuitively, the process validates all chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉 in
C′, then nds the valid chain-pairs with the longest PoW-chain.
We emphasize that since each valid PoS-block is tied to a PoW-block, and each
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Protocol Π = (Πw,Πs)
e protocol is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·). Initially, set Ci := Cinit,
C˜i := C˜init, where Cinit = B−N‖ . . . ‖B−1‖B0 and C˜init = 0‖ . . . ‖0‖0, len(Cinit) = len(C˜init), and then
set statei := {〈Ci, C˜i〉} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ n˜ .
1. PoW-Miner Πw. Each PoW-minerWi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with local state statei proceeds as follows.
Without lost of generality, we assume that the PoW-miners already registered to the functionality
F∗PoW. For each odd round, upon receiving message (Input-Work,Wi) from the environment Z ,
proceed as follows.
(a) Select the best local chain-pair: Upon receiving many messages of the form (Message, P, 〈C, C˜〉)
from FNET for any party P ∈ {W1, . . . ,Wn, Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}, let C be the set of all chain-pair
collected from FNET, then compute 〈Cbest, C˜best〉 := BestValid(C ∪ 〈Ci, C˜i〉, PoW-miner), and
then set Ci := Cbest and C˜i := C˜best.
(b) Aempt to extend PoW-chain:
• Create the pointer to the previous block: Send (head(Ci), head(C˜i)) to the ideal functionality
FRO and receive h from FRO.
• Search for a puzzle solution: If h 6=⊥, then send (Work-Register,Wi) to the ideal func-
tionality F∗PoW and receive ω. en send (Search, ω, h) to the ideal functionality F∗PoW,
and then receive (Searched,Wi, bwi ) from F∗PoW.
• Generate a new PoW-block: If bwi = 1, set B := 〈h, ω〉 (which means Wi is the player
who found the puzzle solution in this round), set Ci := Ci‖B, and statei := statei ∪
{〈Ci, C˜i〉}. en send (Broadcast, 〈Ci, C˜i〉) to FNET.
Return (Return-Work,Wi) to the environment Z .
2. PoS-Holder Πs. Each PoS-holder Sj , for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ n + n˜ , with local state statej , proceeds as
follows. Note that, initially, each PoS-holder sends (Stake-Register, Sj) to the ideal functionality
F∗PoS and receive vk. Also, each PoS-holder registers to the ideal functionality FSIG and receive
vk′ Upon receiving message (Input-Stake, Sj ,X ) from the environment Z where X denotes the
block-payload, proceed as follows.
(a) Select the best local chain-pair: Upon receiving many messages of the form (Message, P, 〈C, C˜〉)
from FNET for any party P ∈ {W1, . . . ,Wn, Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}, let C be the set of all chain-pair
collected from FNET, then compute 〈Cbest, C˜best〉 := BestValid(C ∪ 〈Cj , C˜j〉, PoS-holder), and
then set Cj := Cbest and C˜j := C˜best.
(b) Aempt to extend PoS-chain: Consider there is a new PoW-block B in Cbest.
• Stake election: Send (Elect, vk, B) to the ideal functionality F∗PoS, and receive
(Elected, Sj , ω˜, bsj) from F∗PoS.
• Generate a signature: If bsj = 1, send (Sign, 〈B,X, Sj , ω˜〉) to the ideal functionality FSIG,
and receive (Signed, Sj , 〈B,X, Sj , ω˜〉, σ) from FSIG.
• Generate a new PoS-block: Set B˜ := 〈B, ω˜, vk,X , σ, vk′〉. Next, set C˜j = C˜j‖B˜, and
statej := statej ∪ {〈Cj , C˜j〉}. en send (Broadcast, 〈Cj , C˜j〉) to FNET.
Return (Return-Stake, Sj) to the environment Z .
Fig. 11.: Our main protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in the {F∗PoW,FRO,F∗PoS,FSIG,FNET}-hybrid
model with respect to the local process BestValid (See Figure 12).
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PoW-block or PoS-block is valid if their peers are valid. us, a chain-pair is valid if
all block-pairs in this chain-pair are valid. A valid chain-pair with respect to PoW-miners
should have two member chains (PoW-chain and PoS-chain) of the same length. On the
other hand, a valid chain-pair with respect to PoS-holders may have the PoW-chain longer
than the PoS-chain by one block since the PoW-chain might be extended by one new
block in the previous PoW-round. at said, if the player who executes this process is
a PoS-holder and if there exists a new PoW-blocks, this block would be validated sep-
arately since its corresponding PoS-block has not been generated yet. us, for every
chain-pair, the process rst checks if the length of the PoW-chain in the pair is longer than
the PoS-chain by one block and validates this new PoW-block rst, and then evaluates ev-
ery block-pair of this chain-pair. As said, PoS-blocks are generated from PoW-blocks;
thus, PoS-blocks without corresponding PoW-blocks are not valid. Aer the validation,
the best valid chain-pair is the one with the longest PoW-chain. Please refer to Figure 12
for more details.
Remark 2 (Tie Breaking). Our protocol primarily deals with length so it makes sense to
adopt a simple tie breaking strategy to choose the best chain-pair from two chain-pairs
of equal length. While there is work that show the advantages of choosing a chain ran-
domly (viz. [ES14]), we follow the simple strategy considered in [GKL15]; in which the
best chain-pair is the one with the PoW-chain that is lexicographically the smallest. If two
chain-pairs have same length, and the PoW-chains are same, we compare the PoS-chains with
the same tie breaking mechanism for PoW-chains.
4.2 Security analysis
Our 2-hop blockchain can be viewed as a natural generalization of Nakamoto’s fa-
mous 1-hop blockchain [Nak08]. e security analysis of the 2-hop blockchain here
is inspired and inuenced by previous analysis of Nakamoto’s 1-hop protocol [GKL15;
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Process BestValid
eprocess BestValid is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·) and an initial
chain Cinit. e input is (C′,Type).
For every chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉 ∈ C′, and proceed as follows.
1. Check if len(C)− 1 = len(C˜) and Type = PoS-holder, then set ` := len(C). en verify the new
PoW-block C[`] as follows.
• Verify the pointer in C[`]: Parse C[`] to obtain 〈h`, ω`〉, send (C[` − 1], C˜[` − 1]) to FRO and
then receive (h). If h 6= h`, remove this chain-pair from C′.
• Verify the PoW solution in C[`]: Parse C[`] to obtain C[`] := 〈h, ω〉. Send message
(RO-Verify, h, ω) to the functionality F∗PoW, and then receive (RO-Verified, f). If f = 0,
remove this chain-pair from C′.
2. Check if len(C) = len(C˜) and V (payload(C˜)) = 1, or len(C)− 1 = len(C˜) and Type = PoS-holder. If
yes, for i from len(C˜) to len(Cinit), proceed as follows.
• Verify PoW-block C[i]:
– Verify the pointer in C[i]: Parse C[i] to obtain 〈hi, ωi〉, send (C[i − 1], C˜[i − 1]) to FRO
and then receive (h).
– Verify the PoW solution in C[i]: Send message (RO-Verify, C[i]) to the functionality
F∗PoW, and then receive (RO-Verified, h ′).
If hi 6= h or f = 0, set b1 := 0. Else, set b1 := 1.
• Verify PoS-block C˜[i]: Parse C˜[i] to obtain 〈B, ω˜, S, vk,X , σ, vk′〉.
– send (Verify, ((B, ω˜, S),X ), σ, vk′i) to FCERT ans receive (Verified, ((B, ω˜, S),X , )f).
if f = 1set b2 := 1; b2 := 0 otherwise.
– en send message (Stake-Verify, (B,X, Sj), ω˜, vk) to the functionality F∗PoS.
Upon receiving message (Stake-Verified, (B,X, Sj), f) from F∗PoS, if f = 0 or
B 6= C[i], set b3 := 0. Else, set b3 := 1.
• If b1 = 0 or b2 = 0, or b3 = 0, remove this chain-pair from C′.
3. Otherwise, remove this chain-pair from C′.
Find the valid chain-pair 〈Cbest, C˜best〉 ∈ C′ with the longest PoW-chain. en set 〈Cbest, C˜best〉
as the output.
Fig. 12.: e chain set validation process BestValid.
Intuitively, BestValid ensures that, if Type = PoS-miner, every valid chain-pair should have its
member chains C and C˜ of the same length. On the other hand, if Type = PoS-holder, we allow the
PoW-chain longer than the PoS-chain by one block since there may a new PoW-block produced in
the previous rounds.
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PSS17a]. In order to improve the readability, in general, we will keep consistency of no-
tations. We use the original leers to denote the PoW parameters for the rst hop, e.g., α;
we use leers with tilde to denote the PoS parameters for the second hop, e.g., α˜; nally,
we use leers with hat to denote the collective parameters for both hops, e.g., αˆ.
We use the at mode to simplify of the security analysis. Consider the total number
of PoW-miners is n, the portion of malicious computing power is ρ, and a PoW parameter
p.
Let α = 1− (1−p)(1−ρ)n be the probability that at least one honest PoW-miner mines
a block successfully in a round .
Let β = ρnp be the expected number of PoW-blocks that malicious PoW-miners can
nd in a round.
Here, when pn 1, we have α ≈ (1− ρ)np, and thus α
β
≈ 1−ρ
ρ
. We assume 0 < α 1,
0 < β  1 and α = λβ where λ ∈ (0,∞). We note that, in Nakamoto protocol, λ must
be greater than 1; but in our seing λ could be less than 1, i.e., the malicious parties could
control more computing resource.
We then describe the important parameters in the second hop (i.e., proof-of-stake
blockchain). Similar to that in the rst hop, we consider the total number of PoS-holders
is n˜, the portion of malicious stakes is ρ˜. Let p˜ be the probability that a PoW-block is
mapped to a PoS-holder. We assume p˜n˜  1, so we have:
Let α˜ = 1− (1− p˜)(1−ρ˜)n˜ ≈ (1− ρ˜)n˜p˜ be the probability that a PoW-block is mapped
to at least one honest PoS-holder.
Let β˜ = 1− (1− p˜)ρ˜n˜ ≈ ρ˜n˜p˜ be the probability that a PoW-block is mapped to at least
one malicious PoS-holder.
It is obvious that we have a parameter αˆ = αα˜ which is the probability that honest
parties nd a new PoW-block and is mapped to an honest PoS-holder in a round. We also
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have βˆ = ββ˜ it the expected number that malicious parties nd new PoW-blocks and are
mapped to malicious PoS-holders in a round. We say αˆ and βˆ are collective resources for
honest parties and malicious parties respectively.
We consider the network delay model as in [PSS17a]. We will show in section 4.2.4,
γˆ = αˆ
1+2∆αˆ
can be viewed as a “discounted” version of αˆ due to the fact that the messages
sent by honest parties can be delayed by∆ rounds; γˆ corresponds to the “eective” honest
collective resource. We also assume (α + β)∆ 1.
We are now ready to state our main theorems.
eorem3 (Chain Growth for PoS-chain). Consider protocolΠ = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2.
For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜ ′
in round r′ where t = r′−r > 0, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that len(C˜ ′)− len(C˜) ≥
g · t is at least 1− e−Ω(t) where g = (1− δ)γˆ.
eorem 4 (Chainality for PoS-chain). We assume γˆ = λˆ(α+β)β˜ and λˆ > 1. Consider
protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}
with PoS-chain C˜ in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that, for large enough ` consecutive
PoS-blocks of C˜ which are generated in s rounds, the ratio of honest blocks is no less than
µ = 1− (1 + δ) (α+β)β˜
γˆ
is at least 1− e−Ω(`).
eorem5 (Common Prex for PoS-chain). We assume αˆ = λˆ(α+β)β˜ and λˆ > 1. For any
δ > 0, consider protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For
any two honest PoS-holders Si in round r and Sj in round r′, with the local best PoS-chains
C˜i, C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z where r ≤ r′ and i, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + n˜}, the
probability that C˜i[1, `i]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ) is at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
eorem 6 (Chain Soundness for PoS-chain). We assume αˆ = λˆ(α + β)β˜ and λˆ > 1.
Consider protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any
new spawned honest player PoS-holder Si and any existing honest player Sj in round r,
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with the local best PoS-chains C˜i, C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that
C˜i[1, `]  C˜j and C˜j[1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ) is at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
We notice that the assumptions of γˆ are dierent in chain quality and common prex
properties. is is because if the malicious players want to destroy chain quality property,
he could recycle the computing power from honest miners.
4.2.1 Analysis ideas
In this section, we informally introduce the analysis idea. In our scheme, there are
two types of players, PoW-miners and PoS-holders (stakeholders). Both PoW-miners and
PoS-holders can be honest or malicious. In order to extend the pair of blockchains, a
PoW-miner needs to generate a PoW-block rst, and then the corresponding stakeholder
will sign this block (via F∗PoS) . We note that, our security analysis mainly focuses on
PoS-chain, and the analysis for PoW-chain is followed from PoS-chain’s. Consider that
players may be honest or malicious, we have 4 types of compositions.
Case 1: An honest PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to an honest
PoS-holder. e honest PoS-holder will sign the corresponding PoS-block.
Case 2: A malicious PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to a mali-
cious PoS-holder. e malicious PoS-holder will sign the corresponding PoS-block.
Case 3: An honest PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to a malicious
PoS-holder. e malicious PoS-holders may sign it or just discard it.
Case 4: When a malicious PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to an
honest PoS-holder. He may ask the honest PoS-holder to sign or just discard it.
We rst explain the proof intuition. e malicious players cannot prevent Case 1;
therefore, they cannot prevent the growth of blockchain and Case 1 will guarantee chain
growth property. Furthermore, the malicious parties can generate PoS-blocks from Case
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2 andCase 3. In some consecutive rounds, the total number of PoS-blocks frommalicious
players are bounded by these two cases. If the probability of Case 2 andCase 3 is smaller
thanCase 1, themalicious players cannot generate more PoS-blocks than the honest play-
ers. Since the malicious players cannot prevent Case 1, what they can do is to compete
the blocks from the honest players with their own. Even if they win all of the competition
there are still some blocks from honest players remaining. is will guarantee the chain
quality property. Finally, we assume the probability that all of the PoW-miners nd a new
PoW-block in a round is very small. is means there is no new block being broadcast
in most of the rounds. If all of the honest players do not receive the new block for some
rounds, they would take the same best chain-pair, because they have the same view of the
main chain-pair. If the malicious players want to diverge the view honest players, they
must send new blocks regularly. From our assumption, the malicious players do not have
enough resources to do that. is will bring us common prex property.
We emphasize here, inCase 2 orCase 3 the malicious stakeholder may sign multiple
PoS-blocks based on one PoW-block, and he may send dierent PoS-blocks to dierent
honest miners. However, our scheme will not be eectively aacked by this malicious
strategy. Here, all the PoS blocks (generated by the malicious stakeholder) are valid can-
didate bases for generating the next PoW-block. Once a PoW-block is generated based on
one candidate PoS-block, all of other PoS-blocks (generated by the malicious stakeholder
based on the previous PoW-block) will not be extended by any honest miners.
As discussed above, αˆ = αα˜ and βˆ = ββ˜ are the collective probabilities of Case 1
and Case 2, respectively. We dene them as the collective resources of the honest and
malicious parties, respectively.
We also assume the malicious players may delay the messages from honest players
for a while. We assume that the malicious players can delay any messages in at most
∆ rounds. e intuition is that if the malicious players delay the messages, then the
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honest players might not get the real best chain-pair on time. is will cause the honest
miners working on a wrong chain-pair during the delayed rounds. As a result, the honest
computing power is wasted during these delayed rounds. We use discounted resource to
measure the actual probability that the honest players can generate a block in a round.
e worst case for the chain growth property is that the malicious players will delay all
honest messages to exact∆ rounds in order to decrease the probability that honest players
succeed.
For simplicity, we only discuss the average case for some rounds in this section. e
worst case is guaranteed by Cherno bound if it is in a long time.
Chain growth. In order to calculate the chain growth rate, we consider the worst case
for the honest players. As we discussed, the malicious players cannot prevent Case 1.
e best strategy for the malicious players is to delay all of the messages from the honest
players to discount the honest resources (computing power and stake) of honest players
at most. In our scheme, there are two hops to extend a pair of blocks, so the malicious
players have two chances to delay the messages. ey can delay at most 2∆ rounds for
a PoS-block generation. We use γˆ to denote the discounted collective honest resources
where γˆ = αˆ
1+2∆αˆ
.
We use a hybrid execution to formalize the worst delay seing in the formal proof.
In the hybrid execution, the malicious players contribute nothing to the chain growth and
delay all honest messages to decrease the chain growth rate. We use best public chain-pair
to imply the chain-pair with the longest PoW-chain and known to all honest players. It
is easy to see that when Case 1 happens, the best public chain-pair will increase by 1
block-pair (one PoW-block and one PoS-block). Probability γˆ is the probability a round is
Case 1. e worst chain growth rate is guaranteed by γˆ.
In the real execution, the probability of Case 1 will not be smaller than that in the
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hybrid execution. e message from malicious players will not decrease the chain growth
that is contributed by honest players. erefore, the real chain growth rate is not worse
than that in the hybrid execution.
Chain quality. In order to decrease the chain quality, the best strategy for malicious
parties is to generate as many PoS-blocks as they can. e malicious players can generate
PoS-blocks in Case 2 and Case 3. e total probability of these two cases for a round is
(α + β)α˜.
During any t consecutive rounds, the chain growth rate is at least γˆt on average. e
malicious players will contribute at most (α+β)α˜t. e chain quality will remain at least
1− (α+β)α˜
γˆ
.
Common prex. e adversary can delay any honest messages in at most ∆ rounds,
if an honest PoW-miner generates a new block, the corresponding PoS-block will be re-
ceived in 2∆ later rounds by all honest players. is implies that if no honest player
broadcasts new block in the past 2∆ rounds, all honest players would have same view on
the blockchains, unless malicious players send new block. We say it is a silent round. A
new block will eect the system in at most 2∆ rounds. We assume 2(α + β)∆ 1. e
probability that a round is a silent round is 1− 2(α + β)∆.
We say a round is an honest successful round if there is at least one honest player
generating a new block. An honest successful round is guaranteed by α. We consider
a special case of an honest successful round where only one honest miner generates a
new block. We say it is a pure successful round. In the at model, we can view the hash
queries are independent. us, the success of one query will not eect other queries. In a
successful round, there is at least one successful query. We get rid of this successful query
and consider the others. e probability of a successful query of the others is still no more
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than α. us, the probability of pure successful round is α(1−α). It approximates to α if
we assume α 1.
We assume themalicious players don’t send any new block in the following case rst.
We consider the case that a round is a silent round and also a pure successful round. is
means the successful PoW-miner will generate a unique public chain-pair with the longest
PoW-chain for all honest players. If in the following 2∆ rounds, no honest PoW-miner
sends a new block, then all honest players would take the same best chain-pair. is
means all honest players will be convergent. e only exception is that the malicious
players generate blocks to prevent this convergence. However, by our assumption, the
malicious players cannot generate enough blocks to do this.
Chain soundness. In our protocol, the players select the best chain doesn’t depend
on any existing status they collected. is means that the new spawn player can take the
same strategy as existing players.
More specically, the new spawned player Si can receive the local best chain of any
existing honest player Sj . Let C˜i and Sj be the best local chain Si and Sj .
• If C˜i = C˜j , the chain soundness is guaranteed.
• If C˜i 6= C˜j , we have C˜i is beer than C˜j . e adversary can let another player Sm
take C˜i. If the soundness property is broken then the common prex property is
broken for Sm and Sj .
We emphasize that the soundness property doesn’t hold directly in some pure PoS
schemes such as [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17]. In these schemes, the existing players take best
chain depending on the state of previous rounds. New spawned players must get help
from extra assumption to get the correct state.
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Addressing adaptive corruption. In our protocol, the adversary can corrupt any
player adaptively at any time. e only limitation is the collective resource is honest
majority. We give the analysis idea in two cases:
• In the PoW phase, adversary cannot predict which player will succeed to nd a so-
lution of PoW hash puzzle before the solution is broadcast. e adaptive corruption
of PoW miner will not bring extra advantage comparing with static corruption.
• In the PoS phase, the input of hash inequality includes the signature of stake holder
which is unforgeable for adversary. is will guarantee that adversary cannot pre-
dict which stake holder will be elected before the PoS block is broadcast. e adap-
tive corruption of stake holder will not bring extra advantage comparing with static
corruption.
More details can be found in 4.2.3.
On adaptive key generation. In PoS shceme, the malicious players may generate
and register their verication key vk adaptively to increase the probability that they are
elected. We will prove that our scheme is secure for adaptive key generation. e intu-
ition is we combine the PoW and PoS blocks as a pair, and the PoW block will contribute
randomness for the following PoS block election. e adversary cannot generate a veri-
cation key vk adaptively before the PoW block is generated. However, aer a PoW block
is generated, it is late to register an adaptive key in the transaction. More details can be
found in 4.2.5.
4.2.2 Important terms
We now provide some important terms which are useful for our analysis.
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Denition 14 (Honest Successful Round). We say a PoW-round r is an honest successful
round, if in this round, at least one honest PoW-miner nds a new solution.
Denition 15 (Pure Successful Round). We say a PoW-round r is a pure successful round,
if in this round, exact one honest PoW-miner nds a new solution.
Denition 16 (Honest Stake Successful Round). We say a PoS-round r is an honest stake
successful round, if a new PoW-blockB, which is generated from an honest successful round,
is mapped to an honest PoS-holder, and the PoS-holder broadcasts a new PoS-block aer this
round.
Remark 3. As discussed in previous section, a PoS-block may be invalid because the delay
of the messages on the network. Here, the honest stake successful round also only consider
that the real valid PoS-block is generated.
Denition 17 (Valid Malicious PoW-block). We say a PoW-block B is a valid malicious
PoW-block if (1) the PoW-block B is generated by a corrupted (malicious) PoW-miner, and
(2) it is mapped to a corrupted PoS-holder.
Denition 18 (Hidden chain-pair). We say a chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉 is a hidden chain-pair, if it
is not known to any honest players.
Denition 19 (Hidden PoS-chain). We say C˜ is a hidden PoS-chain, if 〈C, C˜〉 is a hidden
chain-pair.
Denition 20 (Public chain-pair). We say a chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉 is public, if is known to all
honest players.
Denition 21 (Best Public PoS-chain). We say a PoS-chain C˜ is the best public PoS-chain, if
a) C˜ has been received by all of the honest players, b) C˜ is the PoS-chain of the best chain-pair
among all of the public chain-pairs.
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Now we briey analyze the probability that a PoS-round is an honest stake successful
round. We have the probability that a round is an honest successful round is α. Since
the new block generated in the honest successful round will be mapped to a PoS-holder
uniformly by F∗PoS, the probability that an honest stakeholder is selected is α˜. erefore,
the probability that a PoS-round is an honest stake successful round is αα˜ on average.
We consider the probability that a round is a pure successful round. It is easy to see
that this probability is less than the probability that a round is honest successful because
in some honest successful rounds there may be more than one honest PoW-miner nd a
new solution. If α 1, we will see the two probabilities are close.
Lemma 3. Let α  1. For any r, the probability that round r is a pure successful round is
at least α− α2.
Proof. If round r is a pure successful round, round r must be an honest successful round.
Suppose an honest miner nds a new solution in round r. e computing power is at
among all of the miners, get rid of one successful honest miner will not eect the total
computing power very much. If the other miners nd a new solution in round r, then
the probability that the other miners don’t nd any new solution is at least (1 − α) on
average. Puing them together, the probability that round r is a pure successful round is
at least
α(1− α) = α− α2 ≈ α
Following a similar argument, the number of valid malicious PoW-blocks that the
malicious miners will generate in a PoS-round is ββ˜ on average. We remark that, in an
honest stake successful round, the honest PoS-holder can generate a valid PoS-block for
the best local chain chain-pair and send to all of the parties. e malicious stakeholders
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can append the valid malicious PoS-blocks to their (hidden) chain-pair and send the new
solution to some (not necessary all) honest parties.
Furthermore, the honest miners may generate a PoW-block which is mapped to a
malicious stakeholder and vice versa. We describe the following cases:
• Case 1: When an honest PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped
to an honest PoS-holder he would broadcast the PoW-block. e chosen honest
PoS-holder will query the corresponding signature to F∗PoS for that PoW-block and
then produce the corresponding PoS-block. In general, this case will help the honest
public best chain-pair to grow.
• Case 2: When a malicious PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
a malicious PoS-holder, he would send the block to the corresponding PoS-holder
and get the PoS-block. e malicious parties may keep this pair of blocks hidden to
grow a hidden chain-pair.
• Case 3: When an honest PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
a malicious PoS-holder he would still broadcast it. e malicious PoS-holders may
take it to increase the length of chain-pair or just discard this block in order to
prevent the growth of the best public chain-pair.
• Case 4: When a malicious PoW-miner nds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
an honest PoS-holder. If he sends the PoW-block to the corresponding PoS-holder,
then all honest parties would receive it eventually. If it is accepted, it may help to
grow the best public chain-pair, or the malicious PoW-miner may just discard the
block to prevent the growth of chain-pair.
As the discussion, αˆ = αα˜ and βˆ = ββ˜ are the collective probabilities of Case 1 and
Case 2. We dene them as the collective resources of the honest and malicious parties,
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respectively. We remark that, the malicious players may choose dierent strategy on the
4 cases for dierent purposes. For example, if they want to prevent the chain growth, they
may discard as more PoW-blocks as possible. If they want to decrease the chain quality,
they may recycle all of the PoW-blocks that they can “sign” (via F∗PoS) to generate more
PoS-blocks.
4.2.3 Analysis with adaptive corruption
In our model, we consider the adversary who can adaptive corrupt honest parties
at any time. e only limitation is the total number of corrupted players. e collective
resources are honest majority at any time.
In this section, we will prove that such adaptive corruption will not help the adver-
sary gain any advantages other than static corruption. Static corruption means that the
corruption happens at the very beginning of the protocol execution. Let’s consider two
dierent executions EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z(σ) with static corruption and EXEC(Πw,Πs),A′,Z(σ)
with adaptive corruption above, where σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution. Note
that, the adaptive adversaryA′ has the same amount of resources as a static adversaryA,
we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Consider protocolΠ = (Πw,Πs) in Figure 11. Let EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z(σ) denotes the
execution with static corruption and EXEC(Πw,Πs),A′,Z(σ) denotes the execution with adap-
tive corruption where σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution. Consider the two execu-
tions at round r are identical. It holds that the two distributions EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z(σ) and
EXEC(Πw,Πs),A′,Z(σ) are identical at round r + 1.
Proof. If there is no new corruption instruction at round r + 1. e two executions are
identical.
Consider that, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A′,Z(σ), the adversary send (Corrupt, P ) at round
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r + 1 and in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z(σ), P is corrupted at the beginning.
With the functionality F∗PoW, we have:
If P is a PoW miner, the adversary can not predict if P will generate a PoW block in
round r+1 even adversary collect the context at round r. e probability that P generates
a PoW block is identical in the two execution.
With the functionality F∗PoS, we have:
If P is a stake holder, the adversary can not predict if P is elected to sign a PoS
block in round r + 1 even adversary collect the context at round r. e probability that
P generates a PoS block is identical in the two execution.
By Lemma 4, we only consider static corruption in the analysis.
4.2.4 Analysis with bounded delay
We assume that the malicious parties can delay messages in some bounded time
through the functionality FNET which captures the asynchronous network scenario. e
malicious parties can delay anymessages on the network in at most∆ rounds (this is guar-
anteed by FNET) which we say it is a ∆-bounded channel. When an honest PoW-miner
nds a new PoW-block, he will broadcast it to the system and hope all parties will receive
it. If some parties don’t receive the message, the view of the honest stakeholders will keep
remaining divergent for this block. Following a similar argument, if the adversary delays
a message of PoS-block from an honest stakeholder, the view of the honest parties will
diverge for that PoS-block. It is easy to see that for a pair of PoW-block and PoS-block,
the malicious parties have two chances to delay the message to prevent the honest parties
achieving the same view.
As discussed, if any message can be delayed for ∆ rounds, a new pair of blocks can
be delayed in at most 2∆ rounds. e intuition is that the delay of messages will de-
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crease the eciency of block mining. is is because the honest players may not get the
real best chain-pair including the real best PoW-chain and PoS-chain and will therefore
work on some inferior chain-pair. If honest players produce a new block-pair (including a
PoW-block and its corresponding PoS-block) during the delay time and later receive a bet-
ter chain-pair, the new block-pair will be useless and the work for mining the PoW-block
in this block-pair is wasted. As mentioned, we will introduce the “eective” honest col-
lective resources γˆ to capture this intuition later.
Before we do the formal analysis we will give the denition of a silent round.
Denition 22 (Silent Round). We say round r is a silent round, if no PoW-miners (both
honest and malicious) publish any new PoW-chain in the 2∆ previous rounds of round r to
any honest party.
It is easy to see that all honest players will take the same best chain-pair at silent
rounds, unless themalicious players send a beer chain-pair. is is because themalicious
players can delay a new solution from honest player in at most 2∆ rounds. We will show
that in our parameter seing, most of the rounds are silent rounds.
Lemma 5. Let 2(α+ β)∆ 1. For r > 0 and any δ > 0, the probability that round r is a
silent round is 1− 2(1 + δ)(α + β)∆ with probability at least 1− e−Ω(t), where t > 0.
Proof. During any t consecutive rounds, the PoW-miners will generate X = (α + β)t
blocks on average. By Cherno bound, we have Pr[X > (1 + δ)(α + β)t] < 1− e−Ω(t).
Any new blocks may eect at most 2∆ rounds. is means, there are at most 2X∆
rounds that are not silent in t rounds. e total number of silent rounds in t rounds is
t− 2X∆. If t is large, we ignore the bad event thatX > (1 + δ)(α+ β)t. e probability
that a round is silent round in t rounds is:
t− 2X∆
t
> 1− 2(1 + δ)(α + β)∆
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.4.2.4.1 Hybrid expriment
To analyze the best strategy of the adversary and the worst scenario that may hap-
pen to the honest players, we here consider the following executions. Let REAL(σ) =
EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z(σ) denote the typical execution of (Πw,Πs) where
1. σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution,
2. Messages of honest players may be delayed by FNET in at most ∆ rounds.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the messages produced in PoW-rounds
may be delayed to PoS-rounds, and messages produced in PoS-rounds may be delayed to
PoW-rounds.
LetHYBr(σ) = EXECr(Πw∆,Π s∆),A,Z(σ) denote the hybrid execution as in real execution
except that aer round r, HYBr(σ) has the following modications from REAL(σ):
1. e randomness is xed to σ as in HYBr(σ),
2. FNET delays messages generated by honest PoW-miners to exact∆ rounds if the new
PoW-block is mapped to an honest stakeholder,
3. FNET delays all messages generated by honest PoS-holders to exact ∆ rounds,
4. Remove all new messages sent by the adversary to honest players, and delay cur-
rently undelivered messages from corrupted parties to the maximum of ∆ rounds,
5. Whenever some message is being delayed, no honest PoW-miners query the func-
tionality F∗PoW until the message is delivered.
In the REAL(σ) executions, the number of honest stake successful rounds is not less
than in the HYBr(σ).
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e following lemma shows that the PoS-chain of every honest player cannot de-
crease in length if we maximally delay messages from honest parties, freeze all honest
players during this delay, and drop all adversarial messages for every xed randomness
σ. is means the hybrid execution is not worse than real execution.
Lemma 6. For all σ, r, t > 0, given two executions REAL(σ) and HYBr(σ). Let s = r + t.
For any honest PoS-holder Sj at round s, let C˜s,j denote the PoS-chain of Sj at round s in the
execution REAL(σ) and C˜ ′s,j denote the PoS-chain of Sj at round s in the HYBr(σ). We then
have len(C˜s,j) ≥ len(C˜ ′s,j).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. We consider the initial state before round r.
From the denition of hybrid experiment, all players have same view at round r. We have
len(C˜·,·) ≥ len(C˜ ′·,·). We use · to denote all players and all rounds before round r.
We suppose it holds for all players before round s − 1. e only possibility that
len(C˜s,j) < len(C˜ ′s,j) is the player Sj received a new chain to extend C˜ ′s,j at round s in
HYBr(σ). According to the denition of hybrid experiment, this extended PoW-block
must be generated at round s − 2∆ by an honest player Wj′ , that makes len(C˜ ′s,j) =
len(C˜ ′s−2∆,j′) + 1. By the induction hypothesis, len(C˜s−2∆,j′) ≥ len(C˜ ′s−2∆,j′). At the same
time, the player Wj′ must succeed to extend PoW-block at round s − 2∆ in REAL(σ).
is extension will make C˜s−2∆,j′ increase by one block. For playerWj′ is honest, Sj must
have received the extension at (or before) round s.
Puing them together, len(C˜s,j) ≥ len(C˜ ′s,j).
4.2.4.2 Analysis in the worst delay setting
As mentioned earlier, the malicious players can delay the messages on the network
in at most ∆ rounds. is will make some eorts of honest players be wasted. is means
the network delay will discount the collective resources of honest players, the following
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lemma will measure the discount in the execution of HYBr(σ).
Lemma 7. Consider HYBr(σ). Let α, α˜ > 0. We assume that the malicious players will
delay any message for at most ∆ rounds. Let γˆ be the actual probability that a round s > r
is an honest successful stake round, we have γˆ = αˆ
1+2∆αˆ
.
Proof. Consider theHYBr(σ) execution, if round r′ > r is an honest stake successful round,
then all PoW-miners will not query F∗PoW during 2∆ rounds.
Now, assume there are actual c honest stake successful rounds from round r to r +
t,t > 0 in HYBr(σ). We then have the number of actual working rounds for honest
miners will remain t − 2∆c. For each round, the probability that it is an honest stake
successful round is αˆ. We have αˆ(t − 2∆c) = c. is implies that c = αˆt
1+2∆αˆ
= γˆt. We
get γˆ = αˆ
1+2∆αˆ
.
Let viewr denote the view at round r for any execution of REAL(σ) and r > 0. Let
len(viewr) denote the length of the best public PoS-chain chain at round r in viewr. e
following lemma demonstrates that each stake successful round would contribute one
PoS-block to the best chain-pair aer 2∆ rounds in an execution of HYBr(σ).
Lemma 8. Consider execution HYBr(σ). For any honest stake successful round s > r,
len(views)− len(views−2∆) ≥ 1.
Proof. By Denition 16, there is at least one honest PoS-holder producing a PoS-block at
round s. Let C˜s−2∆ be the PoS-chain that is extended by the PoS-holder at round s− 2∆.
We have len(C˜s−2∆) ≥ len(views−2∆). Let C˜s be the PoS-chain that is extended by the
PoS-holder at round s. At the end of round s, all honest players will receive the extended
chain, we have len(C˜s) = len(C˜s−2∆) + 1. us, we have len(views) ≥ len(C˜s). Puing
them together, we have len(views)− len(views−2∆) ≥ 1.
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Corollary 7. Consider execution HYBr(σ). Suppose there are h honest stake successful
rounds from round r to round r + t, it holds that len(viewr+s)− len(viewr) ≥ h.
Proof. Let rk be the kth honest stake successful roundwhere r < rk < r+t and 1 ≤ k ≤ h.
From Lemma 8, we have len(viewrk)− len(viewrk−∆) ≥ 1.
len(viewr+t)− len(viewr) ≥
∑h
i=1{len(viewrk)− len(viewrk−∆)} ≥ h
4.2.5 Analysis with adaptive key generation
In the protocol Πs, PoS-holder is elected by the ideal functionality F∗PoS with some
probability. In the implementation, if a Πs is elected in a round depends on his account
(public key) and some auxiliary inputs. If a malicious players can choose and register a
biased key aer he collects all of the information of the environment, he may get some
advantage to be elected. We call this type of malicious players as adaptive malicious
players and this aack strategy as adaptive key generation aack.
First we will show that adaptive key generation aack will take eect on pure proof
of stake blockchain scheme under some assumption.
Lemma 9. Let Π be any pure proof stake blockchain scheme. e player election function
is F (·, pk). Let p be the probability that a malicious player is elected in a round if there is
no adaptive key generation aack. at is Pr[F (·, pk) = 1] = p for any pk. Let pa be the
probability that a malicious player is elected in a round with adaptive key generation aack.
If F (·, pk) can be predicted by players and the key registration procedure doesn’t aect the
input of F (·, pk) , we have pa = 1− (1− p)ploy(κ).
Proof. For adaptive malicious players, he can generate ploy(κ) dierent public keys in a
round. He will predict F (·, pk) for all of the ploy(κ) public keys. e probability that all
of the ploy(κ) keys are not be elected is (1 − p)ploy(κ). We have pa = 1 − (1 − p)ploy(κ).
He then register the elected key if there is one.
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Our 2hop blockchain is immune to adaptive key generation aack. e intuition is in
our stake election function is F (·, pk), key registration procedure will aect the input ·. In
our scheme, the concrete input ·will contain the output of PoWblock. e key registration
transaction will be included in the previous PoW blocks. If the malicious players want to
register a key adaptively, he must try PoWwhich will still consume the computing power.
Lemma 10. Consider the execution EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z . Let β, β˜ > 0. We assume that the
malicious players will take adaptive key generation strategy. Let γ˜ be the expected number
of PoW blocks which are mapped to malicious stakes that malicious players can nd in round.
We have γ˜ = ββ˜.
Proof. In our scheme, when a valid PoW block is generated, all of the public key of stake
holders are xed in the previous blocks. Any change of public key (registration of new
public key) will make the PoW block be invalid. If the malicious players take adaptive
strategy, he must redo the PoW hash puzzle. at is adaptive strategy will not bring
advantage to the malicious players comparing with the original strategy. We have γ˜ =
ββ˜.
at is in our protocol the key registration will aect the input of PoW block, the ma-
licious players can not take adaptive strategy. How ever in pure proof of stake blockchain
scheme, the key registration is almost free, the malicious players may can register key
adaptively. In order to avoid this aack, there must be some extra assumption in PoS
blockchain, such as a key must have been registered several rounds before it can be
elected.
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4.2.6 Achieving the chain growth property
We here demonstrate that our protocol satises the chain growth property for
PoS-chain (Denition 10). e concrete statement to be proved can be found in eo-
rem 3. We rst prove that our blockchain protocol achieves the chain growth property in
the execution HYBr(σ) before moving to the main theorem.
Lemma 11. Consider the execution HYBr(σ). For any δ > 0, during any t consecutive
rounds aer round r, the number of honest successful rounds is (1− δ)γˆt with probability at
least 1− e−Ω(t).
Proof. Wewill prove that honest stake successful rounds will happen following the honest
collective resources. From Lemma 7, in any t consecutive rounds, the number of honest
stake successful rounds is γˆt on average. LetX be the number of honest stake successful
rounds in the t consecutive rounds. By Cherno bound, we have Pr[X ≤ (1 − δ)γˆt] ≤
e−δ
2γˆt/2.
us, Pr[X > (1− δ)γˆt] > 1− e−δ2γˆt/2 = 1− e−Ω(t).
e honest stake successful rounds will increase the length of the PoS-chain of best
public chain-pair.
Lemma 12. Consider the execution HYBr(σ). For any δ > 0, and for any honest PoS-holder
S with the best PoS-chain C˜r and C˜r′ in round r and r′, respectively, where t = r′ − r  ∆,
the probability that len(C˜r′)− len(C˜r) ≥ g ·t where g = (1− δ)γˆ is at least 1− e−Ω(t).
Proof. For S is honest, C˜r will be received by all honest players no later than round r+ ∆.
We have len(C˜r) ≤ len(viewr+∆). For t  ∆, we consider t ≈ t − ∆ for simplicity.
From Lemma 11, in any t consecutive rounds the number of honest successful round is
more than (1− δ)γt with the probability at least 1− e−Ω(t). Together with Lemma 8 and
Corollary 7, we have len(viewr′)− len(viewr+∆) ≥ (1− δ)γˆt.
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Chain C˜r′ is the best valid PoS-chain accepted by the honest PoS-holder Sj at round
r′. We have len(C˜r′) ≥ len(viewr′). Put them together, len(C˜r′) − len(C˜r) ≥ len(viewr′) −
len(viewr+∆) ≥ (1− δ)γˆt with probability at least 1− e−Ω(t). e corresponding growth
rate is g = (1− δ)γˆ.
Reminder ofeorem 3. Consider protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest
PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜} with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜ ′ in round r′
where t = r′ − r > 0, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that len(C˜ ′)− len(C˜) ≥ g · t is at
least 1− e−Ω(t) where g = (1− δ)γˆ.
Proof. In order to distinguish the notation clearly, we use C˜∆ and C˜ ′∆ to denote the
PoS-chains of the best chain-pairs of S at round r ans r′ in the execution of HYBr(σ).
From Lemma 12, we have Pr[len(C˜ ′∆) ≥ len(C˜∆)+g · t] ≥ 1−e−Ω(t) where t = r′−r,
in HYBr(σ).
We now turn to the chain growth property in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z . From the denition
of hybrid execution, we know that all honest players have same initial status at round r.
We have len(C˜) = len(C˜∆).
By Lemma 6, we have len(C˜ ′) ≥ len(C˜ ′∆).
It follows that,
Pr[len(C˜ ′) ≥ len(C˜) + g · t]
≥ Pr[len(C˜ ′∆) ≥ len(C˜∆) + g · t]
≥ 1− e−Ω(t)
(4.1)
where g = (1− δ)γˆ. is completes the proof.
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4.2.7 Achieving the chain quality property
e chain-quality property (Denition 12) ensures that the rate of honest input con-
tributions in a continuous part of an honest party’s chain has a lower bound. We then
nd the lower bound of the number of PoS-blocks produced by the honest players. We
further show that the number of blocks produced by the adversarial miners is bounded
by their collective resources. Finally, we demonstrate that the ratio of honest PoS-blocks
in an honest player’s PoS-chain is under a suitable lower bound in a sucient number of
rounds with an overwhelming probability.
First, we will build the relationship between length of a chain and the number of
rounds.
Lemma 13. Consider in REAL(σ). For any δ > 0, let Z be the number of rounds which
generate ` blocks, we then have Pr[Z > c`] > 1− e−Ω(`), where c 1.
Proof. Puing all of the resources together, all players can generate αˆ+ βˆ PoS-blocks in a
round on average. In order to generate ` blocks, it will consume `
αˆ+βˆ
rounds on average.
Let c = 1
αˆ+βˆ
, and Z be the number of rounds which generate ` PoS-blocks. For
any δ > 0, by using Cherno bounds, we have Pr[Z ≤ (1 − δ)c`] ≤ e−δ2c`/3. at is,
Pr[Z > (1− δ)c`] > 1− e−δ2c`/3 = 1− e−Ω(`). is completes the proof.
Nowwe consider the contribution of PoS-blocks from honest players in some consec-
utive rounds. If the adversarial players want to contribute more PoS-blocks on the chain,
they will try to generate more PoS-blocks and beat the PoS-blocks from honest players in
the competition. us, the worst case is the adversarial players make use of all the com-
puting power from both honest and malicious miners to generate PoS-blocks and win all
of the competition. We recall the 4 cases in Section 4.2.2. e adversarial players can
make use of Case 2 and Case 3 to generate PoS-blocks. e honest players will use Case
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1 to generate PoS-blocks. First, we will prove the chain quality property in t consecutive
rounds.
Lemma 14. Consider in REAL(σ) and consider ` PoS-blocks of C˜ that are generated in
consecutive rounds from r to r+ t. We assume γˆ = λˆ(α+ β)β˜ where λˆ > 1 and any δ > 0.
en for any honest PoS-holder S with PoS-chain C˜, we have Pr[µ ≥ 1 − (1 + δ) (α+β)β˜
γˆ
] >
1− e−Ω(t), for any δ > 0, where µ is the ratio of honest blocks the PoS-chain C˜.
Proof. Consider ` consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ that are generated from round r to round
r + t. From eorem 3, we have Pr[` ≥ (1− δ∗)γˆ · t] ≥ 1− e−Ω(t) for some δ∗ > 0.
Let Y be the number of valid malicious PoW-blocks which are actually generated in
t rounds in the Case 2. By Cherno bound, we have
Pr[Y < (1 + δ′)ββ˜ · t] > 1− e−Ω(t)
Furthermore, let Z be the number of blocks of generated in Case 3 in t rounds. By
Cherno bound, we have
Pr[Z < (1 + δ′′)αβ˜ · t] > 1− e−Ω(t)
Puing them together, the malicious parties will contribute at most (Y + Z)
PoS-blocks in the t rounds. We then have
Pr
[
µ ≥ `− Y − Z
`
]
> 1− e−Ω(t)
at is, By picking δ∗, δ′, and δ′′ suciently small, we have
Pr
[
µ ≥ 1− (1 + δ)(α + β)β˜
γˆ
]
> 1− e−Ω(t)
for any δ > 0. is completes the proof.
Now we are ready to prove the chain quality property for consecutive blocks on a
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chain.
Reminder of eorem 4. We assume γˆ = λˆ(α+ β)β˜ and λˆ > 1. Consider protocol Π =
(Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1, . . . , Sn+n˜}with PoS-chain C˜
in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that, for large enough ` consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ which
are generated in s rounds, the ratio of honest blocks is no less than µ = 1− (1 + δ) (α+β)β˜
γˆ
is
at least 1− e−Ω(`).
Proof. Let t be the rounds that the ` blocks are generated. From Lemma 13, we have
Pr[t > c`] > 1− e−Ω(`).
From Lemma 14, the ratio of honest PoS-blocks in t consecutive rounds with `
PoS-blocks is µ ≥ 1− (1 + δ) (α+β)β˜
γˆ
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(t).
Puing them together, the probability is at least 1− e−Ω(`). is completes the proof.
4.2.8 Achieving the common prex property
We now turn our aention to proving the common prex property for PoS-chain
(Denition 11) for the proposed protocol. e concrete statement can be found in eo-
rem 5.
Now we will give some informal proof ideas before the formal proof.
• First, from the assumption, we know that if the malicious parties do not get any
help from the honest parties, then they cannot produce PoS-blocks faster than the
honest parties. at means if the malicious parties keep a forked chain-pair hidden
and try to extend it by themselves, then the growth rate of the hidden chain-pair
is smaller than the growth rate of the public longest chain-pair on average. When
considering an extended period of time, the hidden chain-pair will be shorter than
the public chain-pair with an overwhelming probability.
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• Second, we assume there is no new block being generated in most rounds. is im-
plies no new chain will lead the honest players take divergent view in most rounds.
e honest players will try to be convergent aer some silent rounds. If the adver-
sary players want to keep them be divergent, they must send new blocks in silent
rounds. e adversary players don’t have enough resources to do that.
Recall the denition of best public PoS-chain. Best public chain C˜ is: a) C˜ has been
received by all of the honest players which means public. b) C˜ is the best one among all
of the public chains. is implies each honest player will not take any chain worse than
best public chain in any round . Next we will prove, it the adversary players hide some
blocks for a chain, the hidden chain will be worse than the best public chain with high
probability if the hidden length is long. is lemma imply that is the adversary players
keep some blocks privacy, they will be invalid soon. So the adversarial players cannot
store a lot of hidden blocks to destroy the best PoS-chain later.
Lemma 15. Let γˆ = λˆβˆ and λˆ > 1. For any δ > 0, consider the execution REAL(σ). Let
C˜ be the PoS-chain of the best public chain-pair in round r. Let C˜ ′ be the PoS-chain of a
hidden valid chain-pair in round r. Let ` be the length of the hidden part of C˜ ′. We have
Pr[len(C˜) > len(C˜ ′)] > 1− eΩ(`).
Proof. Let round s = r − t be the round that last public block in C˜ ′ is generated . From
Lemma 13, ` hidden blocks need t rounds to generate with probability at least 1 − eΩ(`).
at is, Pr[t > c`] > 1− eΩ(`).
e hidden blocks are contributed by adversarial players only, otherwise they are not
hidden. us, the growth of hidden blocks is from the Case 2. In t rounds, the adversarial
players can generate βˆt PoS-blocks on average. LetX be the number of adversarial blocks
generated in t rounds, by Cherno bound, we have
Pr[X > (1 + δ)βˆt] < e−Ω(t)
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From eorem 3, during t rounds the best public PoS-chain will increase Y > (1 −
δ)γˆt blocks with probability at least 1− e−Ω(t). For γˆ = λˆβˆ, we have
Pr[X < Y ] > 1− e−Ω(t) = 1− eΩ(`)
We denote chain C˜ ′ at round s as C˜ ′s. We have
len(C˜) > len(C˜ ′s) + Y > len(C˜ ′s) +X > len(C˜ ′)
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(`).
We rst prove the common prex property for any t consecutive rounds. e proof
intuition is as follows:
• We assume α+ β  1, that means in most rounds, players will not generate block.
• If only honest players broadcast a new PoW-block, in 2∆ silent rounds, all honest
players will take the same best chain-pair (or PoS-chain), unless adversarial players
send new valid blocks.
• If (α + β)∆ 1, there are no new messages being broadcast in most rounds.
• From a round, the honest players will oen have opportunities to take unique best
chain-pair (or PoS-chain). If the adversarial players want to keep them divergent,
they must broadcast new valid blocks for every opportunity.
• We will prove the adversarial players don’t have enough resource to do that under
our reasonable assumption.
Lemma 16. Let αˆ = λˆ(α + β)β˜ , λˆ > 1, (α + β)∆  1. Assume 0 < δ, δ′, δ′′, δ′′′ < 1,
consider the execution REAL(σ). Except with probability e−Ω(t), there does not exist round
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r ≤ r′ and PoS-holders Si, Sj such that Si is honest at r, Sj is honest at r′ and C˜ri and C˜r′j
diverge at round s = r − t.
Proof. For each round k, we dene a random variableXk. If round k is both pure success-
ful round and silent round, and round k + 2∆ is also a silent round Xk = 1, otherwise
Xk = 0. Let X =
∑
Xk.
Let X ′ be the number of pure successful rounds in t round. By Lemma 3, X ′ is
(α− α2)t on average. By Cherno bound, we have
Pr[X ′ < (1− δ)(α− α2)t] < e−Ω(t)
LetX ′′ be the number rounds which are both pure successful round and silent round.
A round is pure successful round is independent with the event it is silent round. By
Lemma 5, we have
Pr[X ′′ < (1− δ)(α− α2)t(1− 2(1 + δ′)(α + β)∆)] < e−Ω(t)
For (α + β)∆ 1 and α 1, ∃δ′′ s.t.
Pr[X ′′ < (1− δ′′)αt] < e−Ω(t)
A round k is also independent with the event round k + 2∆ is a silent round. Also
by Lemma 5, we have
Pr[X < (1− δ′′′)αt] < e−Ω(t)
If Xk = 1, the new generated block in round k will be mapped to an honest stake-
holder with the probability α˜. We use a random variable Yk for round k. If Xk = 1 and
the new generated block is mapped to an honest stakeholderYk = 1, otherwiseYk = 0.
Let Y =
∑
Yk. We have
Pr[Y < (1− δ′′′)αα˜t] < e−Ω(t)
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If Yk = 1 all honest players will be convergent to a unique PoS-chain unless adver-
sarial players send a new block in the next 2∆ rounds. is is because, a) at round r all
honest players have the best PoS-chain with same length. b) at round r the new extended
PoS-block will increase the best public PoS-chain by 1 block. If there is no adversarial
players send a new chain C˜ ′ with at least the same length, all honest parties will receive
the new PoS-chain in 2∆ rounds and take it as the best chain. e last block of C˜ ′ must
be generated by adversarial players because if is longer than the best public PoS-chain of
honest players.
Let Z ′ be the number of blocks generated by adversarial players in t consecutive
rounds. We have Z ′ = (α + β)β˜t on average. By Cherno bound, we have Pr[Z ′ >
(1 + δ)(α + β)β˜t] < e−Ω(t). From Lemma 15, before round s, the adversarial players
can hide at most κ blocks with an overwhelming probability in κ. Let Z = Z ′ + κ, the
adversarial players can use Z new blocks to prevent the Y convergence opportunities. If
t is large enough, we can have δ′ that Pr[Z > (1 + δ′)(α + β)β˜t] < e−Ω(t).
Puing them together, Y > (1− δ′′′)αα˜t and Z < (1+ δ′)(α+β)β˜twith probability
at least 1− e−Ω(t). By the assumption αα˜ = λˆ(α + β)β˜ and λˆ > 1, we have
Y − Z > (1− δ′′′)αα˜t− (1 + δ′)(α + β)β˜t (4.2)
= ((1− δ′′′)λˆ− (1 + δ′))(α + β)β˜t
> 0
is implies that the adversarial players cannot prevent the best chain-pair (or
PoS-chain) being convergent during the t consecutive rounds with probability at least
1 − e−Ω(t). If at round r, C˜ri and C˜rj are not divergent, then C˜ri and C˜r′j are not divergent.
We have C˜ri and C˜r′j diverge with the probability at most e−Ω(t).
We are now ready to prove themain theoremwhich asserts that our protocol achieves
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the common-prex property with an overwhelming probability in the security parameter
κ. e theorem is formally given as follows.
Reminder of eorem 5. We assume αˆ = λˆ(α + β)β˜ and λˆ > 1. For any δ > 0,
consider protocol Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any
two honest PoS-holders Si in round r and Sj in round r′, with the local best PoS-chains C˜i, C˜j ,
respectively, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z where r ≤ r′ and i, j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , n+ n˜}, the probability
that C˜i[1, `i]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ) is at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
Proof. From Lemma 16, the probability that C˜i and C˜j diverge at round s = r− t is at most
e−Ω(t).
In t consecutive rounds, the total number of PoS-blocks are produced is bounded by
(1 + δ)(α + β)(α˜ + β˜)t with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t). Let t = κ
(1+δ)(α+β)(α˜+β˜)
. We
have C˜i is prex of C˜j except the last κ blocks with the probability at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
4.2.9 Achieving the chain soundness property
e chain soundness property will guarantee that a new spawned player can take the
best chain properly when he join the system. It is critical to achieve a open blockchain
system. e concrete statement can be found in eorem 6.
Reminder of eorem 6. We assume αˆ = λˆ(α + β)β˜ and λˆ > 1. Consider protocol
Π = (Πw,Πs) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any new spawned
honest player PoS-holder Si and any existing honest player Sj in round r, with the local best
PoS-chains C˜i, C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw,Πs),A,Z , the probability that C˜i[1, `]  C˜j and
C˜j[1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ) is at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
Proof. We note that Sj is an honest existing player, Si must receive C˜j in round r. Because
Si take C˜i as best chain we have len(C˜i) ≥ len(C˜j).
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Consider the scenario that the adversary let another existing player Sm also take C˜j
as the best chain and then send Ci to Sm. Now, Sm will take C˜j as the best chain.
If C˜i[1, `]  C˜j or C˜j[1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i) − Θ(κ) then the common prex
property of Si and Sm will be broken. From the eorem 6 we have that the probability
C˜i[1, `]  C˜j and C˜j[1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i)−Θ(κ) is at least 1− e−Ω(κ).
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CHAPTER 5
PRACTICAL POW/POS SYSTEM: TWINSCOIN
In this chapter, we design TwinsCoin—a practical improvement of the 2-hop blockchain.
is is the rst cryptocurrency based on a provably secure and scalable public blockchain
design using both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms from 2-hop blockchain.
e blockchain in our system is more robust than that in a pure proof-of-work based
system; even if the adversary controls the majority of mining power, we can still have the
chance to secure the system by relying on honest stake.
5.1 From 2-hop blockchain to TwinsCoin
Our 2-hop blockchain in Chapter 4 design the rst provably secure and scalable open
blockchain, called “2-hop blockchain”, via combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake.
In their design, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players, PoS-holders (stakehold-
ers) are introduced. A winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain immediately as
in Bitcoin. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder to
be “selected” to extend the blockchain. at is, a PoW-miner and then a PoS-holder jointly
extend the blockchain with a new block. Note that, in Bitcoin, winning PoW-miners di-
rectly extend the blockchain.
In the 2-hop blockchain protocol PoW-chains and PoS-chains are plaited together in
every time step, and these PoW/PoS-chains are extended alternately. Intuitively, the 2-hop
blockchain can be viewed as a proof-of-stake scheme which uses a proof-of-work chain
as a biased random beacon. is critical idea enables the 2-hop scheme to achieve almost
the same eciency as the original Bitcoin scheme. Also, the 2-hop blockchain can scale
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to a large size of network.
Unfortunately, 2-hop blockchain, as it is, has a signicant weakness: the resulting
blockchain protocols are expected to be executed in the static protocol execution envi-
ronments. at is, in each round, the invested/involved physical computing resources as
well as virtual resources (i.e., stake/coins) in the system are always the same. is does
not reect the reality. Take Bitcoin as an example. In the past years, the amount of com-
puting resources that invested for each unit of time period has increased dramatically. In
Bitcoin, Nakamoto creatively introduced the diculty adjustment mechanism to address
this issue. By seing a target of extending the blockchain with a new block in each 10
minutes, and by measuring the total time for extending a xed number (e.g., 2016) of
blocks, each miner can be aware if more computing power has been invested. If so, then
each miner will increase the diculty, and vice versa. Unfortunately, adaptive diculty
adjustment mechanism is missing in the 2-hop blockchain. We remark that blockchains
without adaptive diculty adjustment mechanism can oen be easily broken. Neverthe-
less, the provably secure, and scalable 2-hop blockchain can serve as a good starting point
for us to achieve our research goal.
Adaptive diculty adjustment. In our TwinsCoin system design, we need to make
our blockchain protocols to be adaptive to the protocol execution environments. Note
that here we have to address two types of resources, computing power and stake. It seems
that we need to measure the system through two dierent ways. However, in the origi-
nal 2-hop design, the total number of proof-of-work blocks (PoW-blocks) is equal to the
total number of proof-of-stake blocks (PoS-blocks). It is not clear how to use Nakamoto’s
diculty adjustment mechanism directly for our purpose.
In order to address this issue, we change the blockchain structure. Our new
blockchain structure allow us to “measure” the system thru two dierent ways. Now
we record more PoW-blocks, called aempting proof-of-work blocks; these blocks are gen-
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erated due to a successful rst hop, but a failure second hop. For the sake of presentation,
we call PoW-blocks successful if they are generated due to a successful rst hop along
with a successful second hop. Once we have two types of PoW-blocks, we can measure
the ratio between these two types of PoW-blocks. is idea eventually allows us to design
a new diculty adjustment mechanism.
Moving the underlying blockchain to the non-at setting. In the original 2-hop
blockchain design [DFZ16], the resulting blockchain protocols are expected to be exe-
cuted in the idealized at-model. Note that, in the at model, each proof-of-work miner
holds the same amount of computing power and each proof-of-stake holder has the same
amount of stake (i.e., coins). Apparently, this at model does not reect the reality. Strictly
sticking to the at model will only allow us to design non-practical blockchains.
Blockchain is the core component of our TwinsCoin system. Note that, the designed
and then implemented blockchain in this paper essentially consists of two parts, the PoW-
chain, and the PoS-chain, and they always go along together, like twins, and we coin our
system as TwinsCoin.
Light client design. We propose a way to make light clients possible in a proof-of-
stake seing. As far as we know this is the rst concrete proposal backed by a practical
evaluation.
5.2 Twinscoin design
Starting with a provably secure “core”, the 2-hop blockchain [DFZ16], we develop
our TwinsCoin system by following the steps below.
First, we redesign the structure of the 2-hop blockchain in [DFZ16] with the goal of
enabling a new mechanism for adjusting diculties. We call this a modied 2-hop
blockchain. Please see Section 5.2.1.
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Second, based on the modied 2-hop blockchain, we introduce a new mechanism to
adjust the diculties for both PoW and PoS chains. Please see Section 5.2.2.
In addition, from a dierent angle, we extend the 2-hop blockchain to the non-at set-
ting where stakeholders may have dierent amounts of stake. Please see Section 5.2.3
for details.
By combining these above steps, we have the blockchain for our TwinsCoin. is new
blockchain is in the non-at model with adaptive diculty adjustment.
Finally, we enhance the TwinsCoin system with light clients. Please see Section 5.2.4.
5.2.1 Our modied 2-hop blockchain
We summarize the frequently used notations in Table 1.
Table 1.: Table of notations
Notation Description
κ security parameter.
Cinit an initial blockchain.
B, C a PoW-block, a PoW-chain.
B˜, C˜ a PoS-block, a PoS-chain
B a set of proof-of-work blocks
〈C, C˜〉 a chain-pair
C a set of chain-pairs.
X information stored in blockchain.
Σ unique digital signature scheme Σ =
(Gen,Sign,Verify).
Σ′ digital signature scheme Σ′ =
(Gen′,Sign′,Verify′).
(sk, vk) a unique signing and verication key-pair
(sk′, vk′) an ordinary signing and verication key-pair
Broadcast(·) unauthenticated send-to-all functionality.
We suppose that there exists an initial blockchain Cinit as the starting point, and Cinit is
known to all participants. Now we present the behaviors of PoW-miners and PoS-holders
in our system.
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Miners. Initially, each PoW-miner sets the set of chain-pairs C to empty. is procedure
is formally presented by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Main Protocol: PoW-miner.
1 C← ;
2 while True do
3 C← all chain-pairs received from the network.
4 〈C, C˜〉 ← BestValid(C); Cnew,← PoW(〈C, C˜〉)
5 if C 6= Cnew then
6 C ← Cnew; C← C ∪ 〈C, C˜〉; Broadcast(〈C, C˜〉)
Stakeholders. e initialization of every PoS-holder is the same as PoW-miners except
that each valid PoS-holder is parameterized by a unique pair of signing and verication
keys (sk, vk) , a ordinary key-pair (sk′, vk′) , and amount of coins v . (In this appendix, the
blockchain protocol is described in the at model, and we assume v = 1.) is procedure
is formally presented by Algorithm 2.
5.2.1.1 Proof-of-Work Blockchain
Attempting and Successful Blocks Besides PoS-blocks and PoW-blocks, our modied
blockchain species two types of PoW-blocks: aempting blocks and successful blockswith
respect to the local view of each player in the system. If a node receives a new PoW-block
without a corresponding PoS-block, the PoW-block becomes an aempting block with
respect to the view of the player. In opposite, if a node receives a new PoW-block along
with a corresponding PoS-block, the PoW-block is now considered as a successful block in
the node’s local view.
We now present the blockchain structure in our modied 2-hop blockchain. Please
also see Figure 13.
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Algorithm 2: Main Protocol: PoS-holder. e PoS-holder algorithm is parameterized
by two key-pairs (sk, vk) for the unique signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Verify) and
(sk′, vk′) for the ordinary signature scheme Σ′ = (Gen′, Sign′,Verify′).
1 C← ;
2 while True do
3 C← all chain-pairs received from the network.
4 X ← all payloads received from the network.
5 〈C, C˜〉 ← BestValid(C); C˜new ← PoS(sk, vk, sk′, vk′,X , 〈C, C˜〉)
6 if C˜ 6= C˜new then
7 C˜ ← C˜new; C← C ∪ 〈C, C˜〉; Broadcast(〈C, C˜〉)
Proof-of-Work Block Structure Let H(·),G(·) be cryptographic hash functions with
output in {0, 1}κ where κ is the security parameter. As introduced, we have two dierent
types of PoW-blocks: aempting blocks and successful blocks. e structure of aempting
and successful blocks are the same. However, they have dierent meaning as follows: (1)
no PoS-block links to an aempting block, and (2) we only count the successful blocks
when calculating the real length of a proof-of-work chain. A PoW-block B is a tuple of
the form 〈ctr, hw, hs, ha, ω〉, where
Notation ctr denotes a positive integer, 1 ≤ ctr ≤ q, and q ∈ N is the maximum
number of random oracle queries from each player per unit of time,
Notation hw denotes the digest of the previous proof-of-work block, where hw ∈
{0, 1}κ,
Notation hs denotes the digest of the previous proof-of-stake block, where hs ∈
{0, 1}κ,
Notation ha denotes the digest of the latest seen aempting proof-of-work block,
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Fig. 13.: A modied 2-hop blockchain structure
Here, dot arrows (that link to the previous successful block and aempting blocks) denote the rst
hops, and solid arrows denote the second hops. Green blocks Bi’s denote the successful proof-
of-work blocks, Bji ’s denote the aempting proof-of-work blocks, and red blocks B˜i’s denote the
corresponding proof-of-stake blocks. Note that the blue blocks are from the “mature blockchain”.
where ha ∈ {0, 1}κ
Notation ω is a random nonce, where ω ∈ {0, 1}κ, and blockB satises the inequality
H(ctr,G(hw, hs, ha, ω)) < T where the parameters T ∈ N denotes the current proof-of-
work target of the block.
A PoW-chain C consists of a sequence of ` concatenated successful PoW-blocks. We denote
head(C) as to the topmost successful PoW-block B` in blockchain C. at is, we do not
consider an aempting block as the head of the proof-of-work chain, and the head of a
PoW-chain is not necessary the topmost PoW-block since the topmost PoW-block could be
an aempting block. Moreover, we only link a new proof-of-work block to the head of the
proof-of-work chain. is implies that there may be multiple aempting blocks aaching
to a successful block in our proof-of-work chain. If a chain C is a prex of another chain
C ′, we write C  C ′.
Extending a Proof-of-Work BlockchainMiners maintain our system by extending the
PoW-chain. Algorithm 3 formally describes how to extend a proof-of-work blockchain in
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our system. is algorithm is parameterized by hash functions H(·),G(·) as well as two
positive integers q, T where q is the maximum number of random oracle queries of each
PoW-miner per unit of time, and T determines the “current block target” of the PoW. e
algorithm works as follows: given a chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉, the algorithm computes the hash
hw of the previous PoW-block (the head of the PoW-chain), the hash hs of the head of
the PoS-chain, and the hash ha of the latest aempting block collected. We emphasize
that, the head of the PoW-chain is the “most recent successful block” on the chain (not an
aempting block), and without connecting to the head of the current PoS-chain or the lat-
est aempting block, the adversary can rewrite any information stored on the chain-pair.
e algorithm then samples a random initial string ω of length κ, then it increments ctr
and checks if H(ctr,G(hw, hs, ha, ω)) < T; if a suitable (ctr, hw, hs, ha, ω) is found then the
algorithm succeeds in solving the PoW and extends blockchain C by one block.
We illustrate the high level idea as in Figure 14. In this gure, we consider a
PoW-miner aempting to mine from a valid block-pair consisting of a PoW-blockB and a
PoS-block B˜. ere, in the rst aempt, a new PoW-block B12 is linked to B (by the hash
hw of B) and to B˜ (by the hash hs of B˜); however, the corresponding PoS-block of B12 is
not seen by the PoW-miner. erefore, we sayB12 is an aempting PoW-block. In the sec-
ond aempt, a new PoW-blockB22 is produced without any corresponding PoS-block, this
block also becomes an aempting block. In the third aempt, a new successful PoW-block
with the corresponding PoS-block is aached to the chain.
5.2.1.2 Proof-of-Stake Blockchain
In our system, a digital signature scheme is used by stakeholders to create new valid
PoS-blocks. Let H(·) be a cryptographic hash function with output in {0, 1}κ where κ
is the security parameter. We now introduce the format of a PoS-block. Consider each
PoS player holds two pairs of keys (vk, sk) and (vk′, sk′) for digital signature schemes
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Algorithm 3: e proof-of-work function, parameterized by positive integers q, T and
hash functions H(·), G(·). )
1 function PoW(〈C, C˜〉)
2 Let B be a set of aempting blocks that aach to head(C)
3 Let l be the number of aempting blocks in B.
4 Set ha :=⊥ if B is empty;hw := H(head(C)) hs := H(head(C˜)); ctr← 1;
ω ← {0, 1}κ; B ← 
5 if l 6= 0 then
6 Let Bl be the latest PoW-block found B that aaches to head(C);
ha ← H(Bl)
7 while ctr ≤ q do
8 if (H(ctr,G(hw, hs, ha, ω)) < T) ∧ (ctr ≤ q) then
9 B ← 〈ctr, hw, hs, ha, ω〉; C ← CB
10 ctr← ctr + 1
11 return C ; /* Return the updated chain */
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Fig. 14.: Generating new PoW-blocks
(Gen, Sign,Verify) and (Gen′, Sign′,Verify′), respectively. Note that (Gen, Sign,Verify) is
a unique digital signature scheme [Lys02], while (Gen′, Sign′,Verify′) can be an ordinary
digital signature scheme.
In our system, each valid PoS-block is coupled with a valid PoW-block. Based on
a given PoW-block B, any stakeholder whose verication key vk satises the following
hash inequality H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜ is allowed to generate a new PoS block, where T˜ is the
current proof-of-stake target, hw is the hash value of B and ω˜ ← Signsk(B).
en a new PoS-block B˜ is in the form B˜ = 〈(B, ω˜, vk),X , σ, vk′〉, where X ∈
{0, 1}∗ is the payload of the proof-of-stake block B˜ (also denoted as payload(B˜)); and
σ is produced by the PoS player but by using a dierent signing key sk′, i.e., σ ←
Sign′sk′((B, ω˜, vk),X ).
We dene head(C˜) as the topmost PoS-block of the proof-of-stake chain C˜. We note
that, in PoS-chain, payload is stored, and we use payload(C˜) to denote the information
we store in C˜. If ` is the total number of PoS-blocks in the PoS-chain C˜, then we have
payload(C˜) = ||`i=1payload(B˜i), where || means concatenation.
Extending a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain. In Algorithm 4, we describe how the stake-
holders extend PoS-chains. In more details, Algorithm 4 processes as follows. Upon re-
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ceiving message (sk, vk, sk′, vk′,X , 〈C, C˜〉), the algorithm aempts to extend the specied
PoS-chain C˜ in the chain-pair 〈C, C˜〉; e algorithm then executes the following steps:
Step 1—Leader Election. e algorithm collects all aempting blocks that link to the head
of C. We denote the set of these aempting blocks as B, and denote l as the number
of blocks in B; here, l = 0 means this set is empty and there are no aempting blocks
that follow head(C). en, let B be the latest aempting block in B. If B is not empty
meaning that there exits a blockB, the algorithm checks if the verication key vk is a valid
key (owns the stake) and the inequalityH(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜ holds, where ω˜ ← Signsk(B) and
hw := H(B). If yes, the PoS-holder with the key-pair (sk, vk) is the winning PoS-holder.
Step 2—Signature generation. Aer Step 1 the PoS-holder with signing and verication
keys (sk, vk) is the winning PoS-holder. e algorithm then generates a signature σ ←
Sign′sk′((B, ω˜, vk),X ) using the ordinary signature scheme Σ′with key-pair (sk
′, vk′), and
forms a new PoS-block B˜ = 〈(B, ω˜, vk),X , σ, vk′〉. We say the PoS-holder with the key
pair (sk, vk) extends the specied PoS-chain C˜ with B˜.
e Figure 15 illustrate the structure of a chain-pair aer executing Algorithm 4.
As shown in the gure, we have B the most recently produced PoW-block, and the new
PoS-block B links to B by storing B in the block.
head(C) B
head(C˜) B˜
Fig. 15.: Generating new PoS-blocks
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Algorithm 4: e proof-of-stake function, parameterized by a unique signature scheme
Σ = (Gen,Sign,Verify), an ordinary signature scheme Σ′ = (Gen′,Sign′,Verify′), a pa-
rameter T˜, a function H(·).
1 function PoS(sk, vk, sk′, vk′,X , 〈C, C˜〉)
2 Let B is the set of all aempting blocks that aach to head(C)
3 Let l be the number of aempting blocks in B
4 Let B be the latest PoW-block in B that aaches to head(C)
/* If there is one new PoW-block that attaches to head(C). */
5 ω˜ := Signsk(B)
6 hw := H(B)
7 if l > 0 then
8 if (H(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜)) then
9 σ ← Sign′sk′((B, ω˜, vk),X )
10 B˜ = 〈(B, ω˜, vk),X , σ, vk′〉;C˜ ← C˜B˜
11 return C˜; /* Return the updated chain */
5.2.1.3 Validating a Chain-pair
Chain-Pair validation is the most important process in our design. We rst formally
describe the following predicates used in the ValidateChain algorithm.
Predicate ValidPoWq,TH,G(B,B′, B˜,B, Bˆ). is predicate is parameterized by two integers
q, T, and two hash functions H(·),G(·). e goal of this predicate is to check the valid-
ity of a successful PoW-block B upon receiving inputs: the successful block B, another
successful blockB′, a PoS-block B˜, two sets of aempting PoW-blocks B and Bˆ. Here, the
block B consists of 〈ctr, hw, hs, ha, ω〉, block B′ consists of 〈ctr′, h ′w, h ′s, h ′a, ω′〉, the set B
consists of l aempting blocks {B1, . . . , Bl} where each block Bi = 〈ctri, h iw, h is , h ia, ωi〉
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and the set Bˆ consists of l aempting blocks {Bˆ1, . . . , Bˆl} where each
block Bˆj = 〈cˆtrj, hˆjw, hˆjs , hˆjb, ωˆj〉 for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Note that, PoW-blocks in B and Bˆ are in
temporal-order. e predicate checks the following.
B is properly solved if H(ctr,G(hw, hs, ha, ω)) < T; B links to the previous PoW-block
B′ if hw = H(B′) ;B links to the previous PoS-block B˜ if hs = H(B˜).
If l > 0, check whether B links to the latest aempting block in the second set Bˆ if
ha = H(Bˆ
l).
If l > 0, check whether all aempting blocks in B are properly solved if for 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
H(ctri,G(h iw, h
i
s , h
i
a, ω
i)) < T
If l > 0, check whether all aempting blocks Bi = 〈ctri, h iw, h is , h ia, ωi〉 in Bˆ are prop-
erly linked if
• Bi links to the previous PoW-block B′ if h iw = H(B′).
• Bi links to the previous PoS-block B˜ if h is = H(B˜).
• Bi links to the previous aempting block in the set B if h ia = H(Bi−1) (Note that,
we consider B0 = B′.)
e predicate ValidPoWq,TH,G outputs 1 if and only the examined block B passes all
tests described above.
Predicate ValidPoSΣ,Σ
′,T˜
H (B˜, B). is predicate is parameterized by a uniqe signature
scheme Σ, an ordinary signature scheme Σ′, and an integer T˜, and a hash function H(·).
e goal of this predicate is to check the validity of a PoS-block B˜ = 〈(B, ω˜, vk),X , σ, vk′〉
upon receiving inputs: a PoS-block B˜, a PoW-block B.
e predicate checks the following
B˜ is generated by an elected PoS-holder if H(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜, where hw = H(B)
B˜ links to the corresponding PoW-block B if B = B′
e signature σ is properly generated if Verify′vk′((B, ω˜, vk),X , σ) = 1
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Algorithm 5: e chain-pair validation algorithm, parameterized by a unique signature
schemeΣ = (Gen,Sign,Verify), an ordinary signature schemeΣ′ = (Gen′, Sign′,Verify; ),
the stake-identity set S, parameters q, T, T˜, an initial chain Cinit, the hash functions H(·),
H(·),G(·) and the content validation predicate V (·).
1 function ValidateChain(〈C, C˜〉)
2 b← V (payload(C˜))
3 if b = True then
4 repeat
5 B ← H(head(C)); B˜ ← H(head(C˜))
6 Let B is the set of all aempting PoW-blocks aaching to head(C)
7 Truncate all PoW-blocks from the head of C (including the head), and
truncate the head of C˜
/* obtain new heads */
8 Let Bˆ is the set of all aempting PoW-blocks aaching to the
newhead(C)
9 b1 ← ValidPoWq,TH,G(B, head(C), head(C˜),B, Bˆ)
10 b2 ← ValidPoSΣ,Σ′,T˜H (B˜, B); b = b1 ∧ b2
11 until (C = Cinit) ∨ (b = False);
12 return b
e predicate ValidPoWΣ,Σ
′,T˜
H outputs 1 if and only if the examined PoS-block B˜
passes all tests described above.
Our chain-pair validation algorithm, denotedValidateChain, is introduced to examine
if a pair of chains (including a PoW-chain and a PoS-chain ) is valid. Intuitively, a valid
chain-pair means its members PoW-chain C and PoS-chain C˜ are both valid, respectively.
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Furthermore, each block of the PoS-chain must contain the valid supporting signature for
the corresponding block of the PoW-chain. Please refer to Algorithm 5 for more details.
Resolving fork. In 2-hop blockchain design, fork is resolved by choosing the chain-
pair with the longest PoW-chain. In our design, a PoW-block could be an aempting
or successful block. Furthermore, successful blocks are much more important than
aempting blocks. erefore, the winning chain-pair is the one with the most number
of successful blocks, that is, the one that required (in expectancy) the most successful
mining power.
Security. We emphasize that, this section only focuses on the structure of the blockchain.
We slightlymodify 2-hop blockchain to construct amore practical cryptocurrency system.
e security proof for this modied version is directly implied from 2-hop blockchain
security.
5.2.2 Blockchain with adjustable diculty
Nakamoto’s diculty adjustment for PoW. In Bitcoin, in order to keep the block with
a steady rate, the system adjusts the PoW hash target adaptively. e intuition is that the
lower target means lower probability to get a valid PoW block by calling a hash function.
is intuition provides a method to control the block generation rate by a target adjust-
ment scheme. For some time interval, if the chain extension rate is higher than expected,
the target needs to be decreased to make the successful probability lower.
e target is adjusted every m blocks, In Bitcoin, m = 2016. We dene a time period
ofm blocks (precisely, dierence between timestamps of the last and the rst blocks in the
sequence) as an epoch. Let t be the expected time of an epoch. For example, in Bitcoin a
new valid block is to be generated every 10 minutes on average. en we have t = m×10
minutes, which is approximately 14 days for an epoch. Let ti be the the actual duration of
the i-th epoch. Let Ti be the target in the i-th epoch. We have the target in the (i+ 1)-th
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epoch as follows:
Ti+1 =
ti
t
Ti (5.1)
From the equation above we can observe that, if ti > t then Ti+1 > Ti and vice-versa. In
the case that ti > t, the miners spend longer time to obtain m blocks in the i-th epoch.
erefore, the target should be increased so that the miners can nd new blocks faster in
the next epoch. is negative feedback mechanism makes the system stable.
Our diculty adjustment for PoW/PoS.We propose two adaptive target mechanisms
for PoW and PoS chains in order to keep the chain-pair growth with a stable rate. First,
we use T to denote the PoW target in general. We also use Ti as the PoW target in the i-th
epoch. e PoW target is used to control the probability of nding a new valid PoW-block
for each aempt. Secondly, we use T˜ to denote the PoS target in general. We also use T˜i
as the PoS target in the i-th epoch. e PoS target is used to control the probability that
a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a valid stakeholder.
PoS target adjustment. To extend a PoS-chain, a stakeholder uses the inequality
H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜ to test if he is eligible to sign a PoS-block. Here, B is a new PoW-
block and vk is the verication key of the stakeholder, and ω˜ is the unique signature ofB.
We assume the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to
a stakeholder is V < 1. Suppose there are mi PoW-blocks that are generated in the i-th
epoch, and let T˜i be the PoS diculty in the i-th epoch, the PoS diculty in the (i+ 1)-th
epoch is dened by the following equation:
T˜i+1 =
miV
m
T˜i (5.2)
We interpret the PoS diculty adjustment by the following. If mi
m
V > 1, then the prob-
ability that the PoW-block is mapped to a stakeholder is lower than the expectation V;
therefore, the PoS target T˜i+1 will be increased. Similarly, if mim V < 1, then the probability
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that the PoW-block is mapped to a stakeholder is higher than the expectation V; therefore,
the PoS target T˜i+1 will be decreased. It is easy to see this is a negative feedback algorithm
that can ensure that the successful probability is close to V.
PoW target adjustment. e diculty adjustment strategy for PoW-chain in our system
is similar to the original Bitcoin system except that we additionally consider the inuence
of PoS-chain generation to the PoW-chain.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, in order to generate a valid block a miner need to try
dierent ω to satisfy a hash inequality, i.e., H(hw, hs, ha, ω) < T. It is easy to see that if we
increase T, the probability to generate a valid PoW-block of one hash query will increase,
and vice versa. We assume the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a
stakeholder is V < 1. e diculty is adjusted everym PoW-blocks of the chain-pair. We
can take the typical value m = 2016 as in Bitcoin system. We use mi to denote the total
number of aempting (and successful) PoW-blocks that are generated in the i-th epoch. If
some PoW-blocks are not be successfullymapped to stakeholders, wewould havemi > m.
Similar to Bitcoin, we also use t to denote the expected time span for an epoch, and ti do
denote the actual time span for the i-th epoch. Let Ti be the target in the i-th epoch. e
target in the (i+ 1)-th epoch is dened by
Ti+1 =
mti
mitV
Ti (5.3)
e diculty adjustment for PoW is based on two “factors”, ti and mi. e logic is
as follows:
If ti < t, we know that the i-th epoch is shorter than expected. In this case, we need
to decrease Ti+1 to increase the PoW diculty in the (i + 1)-th epoch. Similarly, if
ti > t, we need to increase Ti+1 to decrease the PoW diculty.
Ifmi > m/V, we know that the probability that PoW-block can be mapped to a stake-
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holder is lower than the expectationV. In this case, the PoS diculty (see PoS diculty
adjustment) would be decreased and we need to increase PoW diculty (by reducing
Ti+1 ). Similarly, ifmi < m/V, the PoS diculty would be increased, then we need to
decrease PoW diculty (by increasing Ti+1).
Potential attack on adjustable diculty. Garay et al. [GKL15] and then Pass et
al. [PSS17b] analyze blockchain without considering diculty adjustment. e diculty
D is xed and reect the probability p that a hash query is a successful query. Together
with the number of players n, p will control the probability that a player nds a valid
solution in a round. Furthermore, they also assume the ratio of honest players ρ which
provides an upper bound on the probability that a round is a successful round. Notation
α is used to denote the probability that some honest player succeeds in solving a puzzle
in one round and β is used to denote the expected number of blocks that an aacker can
mine in a round. they assume α 1 and β  1 to analyze the protocol.
Garay et al. [GKL17] discuss backbone protocol with variable diculty. ey assume
that in any consecutive s rounds the mining power will increase γ times at most. ey
study the security properties under this assumption. A potential aack on adjustable
diculty is that malicious parties may stop tomine new blocks in some rounds. According
to the algorithm, the target D will be decreased to make the successful query easier so
that the system will keep a consistent pace to generate new blocks. e malicious players
then begin to mine new blocks under this dicult target. If the assumption α  1 and
β  1 is broken, then the system would be insecure.
Security analysis on Nakamoto’s. We provide an security analysis to demonstrate that
the malicious players are not able to aack the Nakamoto’s system by taking advantage
of the diculty adjustment mechanism. Our analysis uses the original security proof in
Garay et al. [GKL15] as a black box. ey have proven the backbone protocol will achieve
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chain quality and common prex properties based on some reasonable assumptions.
We will follow the same assumption and notations as in [GKL15]. Parameter p de-
notes a probability of that a hash query satisfy the target. e malicious players may
change p by eecting the adjustable diculty. We will prove the aack will not break
the assumption in [GKL15]. We use the number of rounds to measure the duration time
t instead of the actual time. We also use ti to denote the number of rounds for the i-th
epoch.
Lemma 17. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In
each round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch
and t be the expected rounds for an epoch. Let p be the probability that a hash query satises
the target. For any constant δ > 1, we have Pr[p ≤ (1 + δ) m
nqρt
] > 1− e−Ω(δ).
Proof. First, we discuss the average case. If the malicious players stop to contribute any
blocks, the epoch would become longer than the expectation. From the equation 5.1, it is
easy to see that the target T would be increased, as well as the parameter p. Aer some
time, this would reach to a stable status in the i-th epoch, that is Ti+1 = Ti. We get ti = t.
In the i-th epoch, only honest computing power tries to generate new blocks. On average,
the honest miners will generate nqρtip = m blocks in the i-th epoch. For ti = t, we get
nqρtp = m. at is p = m
nqρt
. Now, we turn to the worst case. When p ≥ m
nqρt
, suppose
that in t rounds the honest miners generatem blocks. By Cherno bound, we have Pr[t >
(1 + δ)t] < e−Ω(δ) . From the equation 5.1, we have Pr[Ti+1 > (1 + δ)Ti] < e−Ω(δ). at
is Pr[p > (1 + δ) m
nqρt
] < e−Ω(δ). We get Pr[p ≤ (1 + δ) m
nqρt
] > 1− e−Ω(δ).
Lemma 18. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In each
round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch and t
be the expected rounds for an epoch. If m
t
 1, we have α 1 and β  1 with probability
that is no less than 1− e−Ω(δ), for any δ > 1.
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Proof. From the denition, we haveα ≈ nρqp. From lemma 17, we haveα ≤ (1+δ)m
t
 1
with probability that is greater than or equal to 1− e−Ω(δ). We also have β ≈ n(1− ρ)qp.
From lemma 17, we have β ≤ (1 + δ)m(1−ρ)
tρ
 1 with probability that is no less than
1− e−Ω(δ).
We therefore conclude that the malicious players cannot break the assumption by
tuning the target.
Security analysis on TwinsCoin.Wehere provide security analysis to demonstrate that
the malicious players are not able to aack the TwinsCoin system by taking advantage of
the diculty adjustment mechanism. In [DFZ16], the authors give a formal security proof
for 2-hop blockchain (without considering diculty adjustment). ere, they assume that
the probability that a PoW block is generated in a round is very low. ey also assume the
probability that a PoW block is mapped to a valid stake is much less than 1. A potential
aack is that the malicious players can increase the target to make it is easier to generate
a PoW block, or increase the probability that a PoW block is mapped to a stake.. In this
section we prove that this aack does not work for our modied 2-hop blockchain under
a certain assumption.
e intuition is that in order to increase the target, the malicious players can stop
to contribute new PoW-blocks and PoS-blocks from some moments. is will make the
block extension rate lower. By our diculty adjustment algorithm, the target will increase
to speed up the block generation. At some later point, the malicious players will begin to
work and sign under the increased target. We will follow the notations in [DFZ16]. We
assume all of the computing power can make n hash queries to generate PoW-blocks in
an epoch. e ratio of honest computing power is ρ. We also assume the total amount of
coins is nˆ and the honest ratio is ρˆ.
Lemma 19. Let V be the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully
101
mapped to a stakeholder. Total amount of coins is nˆ and the honest ratio is ρˆ. Let α˜ and β˜
be the probabilities that a PoW-block is mapped to an honest stake and a malicious stake,
respectively. For for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have α˜ ≤ V
1−δ and β˜ ≤ 1−ρ˜ρ˜ V1−δ with probability that
is no less than 1− e−Ω(δmV ).
Proof. First, we discuss the average case. If the malicious players stop sign PoS blocks,
the PoS target T˜ would be increased. When the honest players can sign PoS block with
the expectation probability V, the PoS target will be stable. at is T˜i+1 = T˜i. From
the equation 5.2, we have m
mi
= V. at is mi = mV . Now, we turn to the worst case.
When the malicious players stop sign PoS blocks, we have α˜ = m
mi
= V. with Cherno
bound, for any δ ∈ (0, 1) we have Pr[mi < (1 − δ)mV ] < e−Ω(δ
m
V
). at is Pr[α˜ = m
mi
>
V
1−δ ] < e
−Ω(δm
V
). e malicious will take the same PoS target, we have Pr[β˜ > 1−ρ˜
ρ˜
V
1−δ ] <
e−Ω(δ
m
V
).
From the Lemma 19, α˜ and β˜ will not break the assumption by diculty adjustment
with high probability.
Lemma 20. Let V be the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully
mapped to a stakeholder. Total amount of coins is nˆ and the honest ratio is ρˆ the malicious
ratio is 1 − ρˆ. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In
each round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch
and t be the expected rounds for an epoch. If m
t
 1, we have α  1 and β  1 with
probability that is no less than 1− e−Ω(δ).
Proof. From Lemma 19, we have α˜ ≤ V with probability that is greater than or equal to
1−e−Ω(mV ). Puing it together with the equation 5.3, we have Ti+1 ≤ tit Ti with probability
that is no less than 1 − e−Ω(mV ). is means the target Ti will be increased no faster than
it is in equation 5.1. We can show the proof in the similar way as in Lemma 18.
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From the Lemma 20, α and β will not break the assumption by diculty adjustment
with a high probability.
5.2.3 PoS blockchain in the non-at model
Moving PoS blockchain from the at to the non-at model. e (modied) 2-hop
blockchain in section 5.2.1 is described in the at model with a pre-xed diculty param-
eter. Intuitively, if PoS-holders have dierent amounts of stake (coins), they would have
dierent probabilities to be elected. us, we improve the construction to be suitable for
non-at model that means the PoS-holder can keep dierent amount of stake in an ac-
count. Next, we prove that our construction is fair in the non-at model so a PoS-holder
would not get any advantages if he splits his stake to multiple accounts.
We describe the non-at model with hash inequality rst. For a stakeholder, vk is
his verication key (public key), and sk is the corresponding signing key. To extend
PoS-chain, the stakeholder will choose the best chain-pair with the most “successful” min-
ing power. Let 〈C, C˜〉 be the best chain-pair, and C is PoW-chain, C˜ is PoS-chain. If the last
PoW-block B on chain C is a new block in which there is no corresponding PoS-block on
PoS-chain, then the stakeholder would aempt to generate a new PoS-block as the follow-
ing: Let T˜ denote the current diculty target for the PoS-block generation. We assume the
total amount of stake in the whole system is nˆ, we also assume the length of the output
of hash function H(·) is κ. Let p = T˜
2κ
, we assume nˆp < 1. Let v be the number of coins
in the account of a stakeholder with vk. If the inequality H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < T˜ is satised,
the stakeholder with the key-pair (sk, vk) would win a chance to sign the corresponding
PoS-block for PoW-blockB. As far as we know this is the rst concrete non-at treatment
for PoS-chain.
Security analysis. We provide here a security analysis for the non-at model. e play-
ers may take more than 1 coin in an account under non-at model. We will argue that if
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a stakeholder puts more than 1 coin in his account, this would not change the probability
for PoS-block mapping. Intuitively, from our non-at construction, if a PoS-holder puts
more coins in an account, he has a higher probability to be selected; therefore, he does
not need to split his coins into multiple accounts.
Lemma 21. Let p = T˜
2κ
and κ is the length of hash output. Let nˆ be the total number of
coins. We assume nˆp < 1. For any stakeholder with account (sk, vk), we assume there are v
coins in this account, where v < nˆ. We have Pr[H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < v T˜] = vp.
Proof. From the denition we have v T˜ = vp2κ. For nˆp < 1 and v < nˆ, we have v T˜ < 2κ.
SinceH(B, vk) produces the output uniformly in (0, 2κ), we havePr[H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) < v T˜] =
vp.
From the Lemma 21, we have the probability that a stakeholder is selected to generate
a PoS-block is proportional to the amount of stake he controls.
If the PoS-holder puts his v coins in one account, for any PoW blockB, the probability
that he is selected to sign the corresponding PoS block is vp.
If the PoS-holder puts his v coins in v accounts and every account has one coin, for
any PoW-blockB, the probability that an account is selected to sign the corresponding
PoS-block is p. e outputs of hash function H˜(hw, ω˜, vk) are independent for dierent
unque pair (vk, ω˜). e total probability that the PoS-holder is selected is also vp.
at is, the probability a stakeholder is selected in the non-at model is equal to
the accumulated probability that he distributes the stake to dierent accounts in the at-
model. For a PoS-holder, the probability that he is selected only depends on the total
amount of stake (coins) he controls.
We summarize our TwinsCoin design in Figure 16. Startingwith the 2-hop blockchain
4, we rst propose a slightly modied version (Section 5.2.1) by changing the structure of
the proof-of-work chain as well as the format of proof-of-work blocks. en we improve
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this modied 2-hop blockchain further, (i) by enabling diculty adjustment for both PoW
and PoS chains (see Section 5.2.2), and (ii) by introducing an alternative method to choose
stakeholders to extend the PoS chain in the non-at seing where players may have dif-
ferent amounts of coins. By combining these improvements with light client design, we
complete the blockchain design in our TwinsCoin system.
4.1Sec 5.2.1 (Modied 2-hop)
Sec 3.2Chapter 4 ( -hop)
4.2Sec 5.2.3 (Non-Flat)
Sec 5.2.1 (Modied 2-hop)Sec 5 2.4 (Light Client)
Sec 5.2.1 (Modied 2-hop)TwinsCoin
FSIGSec 5.2.2 (Diculty Adjustment)
Fig. 16.: Roadmap for blockchain design in TwinsCoin.
5.2.4 Light client design in TwinsCoin
Checking the validity of a proof-of-work block requires a constant-time opera-
tion (i.e., two SHA256 invocations); thus for a blockchain with n blocks, the time to check
the validity is linear (O(n)). In contrast, in all the proof-of-stake protocols checking a bal-
ance of a block generator is needed in order to verify the validity of blockchain. Currently,
holding the whole balance sheet is needed for the verication. However, this creates lots
of diculty for light clients. Verication time (if a balance sheet is indexed by a public key)
for a block is about O(logS), where S is a size of the balance sheet. Once balance sheet
becomes too big to be stored in random-access memory, performance could be degraded
signicantly. In Bitcoin, once block size limit is reached, size of a balance sheet (more
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precisely, unspent outputs set) is growing roughly linearly with time (a corresponding
graph could be found at [Blo17]), thus verication time for n PoS blocks is O(n · log n).
e concerns of heavy validation could be the solid arguments against switching from a
Proof-of-Work chain to the hybrid one.
As a solution, we propose to authenticate the balance sheet as 2-party dynamic au-
thenticated (public key→ balance) dictionary. In the paper [FC:RMCI17] an authenti-
cated data structure of this kind is proposed to be used in order to avoid holding all the
state for the full nodes. We are applying the principle further in order to make light clients
feasible in a Proof-of-Stake environment.
A root value aer processing the transactions in a block is to be included in a block-
header of a PoS-block. Also, a stakeholder generating a block is including an authenticat-
ing path for his output against a root of a previous PoS-block. However, verication time
for a block remains theO(logS), withO(n · log n) for a chain, but a constant factor would
be much smaller. We back the claim with an experiment provided in Section 6.2.0.2. It is
not needed to hold the whole state in order to check whether a PoS-block was generated
in a valid way, as by using a 2-party authenticated dynamic dictionary it becomes pos-
sible to check proofs and get a new root value without holding the whole dataset. As a
drawback, block size would be increased byO(logS) bytes, we provide concrete numbers
in Section 6.2.0.2.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
We provide a full-edged implementation of TwinsCoin. Details on the implementation
are provided in Section 6.1. We run several experiments on particular aspects of our design
in order to empirically evaluate the claimsmade throughout the paper and also study some
aspects of proof-of-stake diculty readjustment function in Section 6.2. We also run fully
functional TwinsCoin nodes over a testing network which is described in Section 6.2.1.
6.1 Implementation
We implement TwinsCoin using the Scorex framework [Inp16] in Scala language.
Our implementation is full-edged. erefore, it is possible to run the testing network
without any code modications. Our implementation is opensourced 1 and published
under public domain CC0 license.
ere are a few open source modular blockchain development tools available, such
as Scorex [Inp16], Sawtooth Lake [Int16a], and Fabric [IBM16]. We choose to use Scorex
2.0 [Inp16] because this is the only existing tool which supports two (or more) types of
blocks.
e idea of a modular design for a cryptocurrency was rst proposed by Goodman in
Tezos whitepaper [Goo]. e whitepaper (Section 2 of it) proposes to break a cryptocur-
rency design into three protocols: network, transaction and consensus. In many cases,
however, these layers are tightly coupled and it is hard to describe them separately. For ex-
ample, in a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency a balance sheet structure, which is heavily inu-
1hps://bitbucket.org/TwCoin/twinscoin
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enced by a transaction structure, is used in a consensus protocol. To split the layers clearly,
Scorex 2.0 has ner granularity. In particular, in order to support hybrid blockchains as
well as more complicated structures than a chain (such as SPECTRE[SLZ16]), Scorex 2.0
does not even have a notion of the blockchain as a core abstraction. Instead, it provides
an abstract interface to a history which contains persistent modiers. e history is a part
of a node view, which is a quadruple of 〈history, minimal state, vault, memory pool〉. e
minimal state is a data structure and a corresponding interface providing an ability to
check a validity of an arbitrary transaction for the current moment of time with the same
result for all the nodes in the network having the same history. e minimal state is to be
obtained deterministically from an inital pre-historical state and the history. e vault is
the node-specic information, for example, a node user’s wallet. e memory pool holds
unconrmed transactions being propagated across the networks by nodes before got into
blocks.
e whole node view quadruple is to be changed atomically by applying whether a
persistent node viewmodier or an unconrmed transaction. Scorex provides guarantees
of atomicity and consistency for the application while a coin developer needs to provide
implementations for the abstract parts of the quadruple as well as a family of persistent
modiers. Our implementation is introducing two kinds of persistent modiers, PoW-
Blocks and PoS-Blocks.
Our implementation has simpler transactions than Bitcoin [Wikc]: while a Twin-
sCoin transaction has multiple inputs and outputs, like in Bitcoin, an output contains
only a public key of a spender and a value (so no support for Bitcoin Script [Wikb] or
another authentication language is provided). To spend an output, one needs to sign its
bytes in a referring input. In order to prevent replay aacks, we also associate an output
with an unique nonce value, which is a result of hash(all the transaction bytes without
nonces ‖ output index in the transaction). Like in Bitcoin reference implementation, the
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minimal state in the TwinsCoin is the current unspent outputs set (UTXO [Gui] set). In
both the systems, with the UTXO set it is possible to decide whether an arbitrary trans-
action valid against it or not. By processing a block, a node is removing outputs spent in
the block from the set and put there newly created unspent outputs.
We also have implemented block generation functionality directly inside the node
soware. Iteration over nonce space in Proof-of-Work mining component is articially
limited in order to reduce the load of an evaluation environment and model non-at min-
ing networks easily. us, a number of hash function calls per second is to be set explicitly
in code. As in Bitcoin, a proof-of-work function is about to nd a hash value with a certain
property of a block header with a nonce eld included. We use Blake2b hash function with
256 bits output to have 128-bit security level. In our implementation PoW-miners start to
work on a next aempting block right aer previous one seen and before corresponding
PoS-block arrives. us the mining component working all the time except PoS-block
processing phases.
Rollbacks are possible in a blockchain system if a beer fork found. We store all the
blocks ever got from the network (Bitcoin does the same), so an implementation of the
history interface is just switching a pointer to a new best chain in case of a fork. For the
minimal state (the UTXO set) as well as for the wallet we need to restore an old version
of possibly big dataset before applying blocks from a new best chain aer a common one.
To simplify previous database snapshot restoring, we are using a versioned key-value
database engine IODB [Kot]. IODB has been built to be used in blockchain systems, so
it provides batch updates only and a rollback to an arbitrary snapshot in the past within
depth to be set during database creation.
We are reusing peer-to-peer network from the Scorex without any changes. Nodes in
the network send announces about their blocks and transactions with INV messages like
in Bitcoin [Wika]. A new block is announcedwith the samemechanism; thus, propagation
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time for miners is worse than in Bitcoin network where miners have direct low-latency
links to each other and push a header of a new block immediately.
Our implementation is compact, just about 2,300 lines of code, thanks to the frame-
works used and concise Scala language.
6.2 Experiments
In this section, we investigate some aspects of the TwinsCoin proposal with the help
of targeted experiments. First experiment is about a competition of two chains, an honest
and an adversarial, similar to described in the original Nakamoto paper ( [Nak08], Section
11). e goal of a second experiment is to measure eciency of the light client proposal
from the Section 5.2.4. ird experiment examines proof-of-stake diculty readjustment
procedure in a simulated environment.
6.2.0.1 Chain race experiment
In the original Bitcoin paper [Nak08], Nakamoto evaluated his proposal by consid-
ering competition of two chains, one of an adversary and another of an honest miner
showing that the adversarial chain cannot overtake the honest one until it is backed by
majority of mining power. As there are two resources providing a possibility to generate
a block in our proposal, we simulate an adversary possessing dierent amounts of total
hashing power and also total stake.
In our experiment, an adversarial and an honest parties work on separate TwinsCoin
instances generating chain-pairs of length 10 (so 10 PoW-blocks and also 10 PoS-blocks).
A party which generates its chain-pair rst wins the race. e honest party owns 100
outputs locking the same amount of money while the adversary has only some fraction
of that. Diculties are static during the experiment, time to generate a PoW-block on
average is overwhelmingly big in comparison with time needed to process a block, and
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proof-of-stake diculty is set to have about 1 output chosen on average for the honest
party. e code could be found in the le PrivateChain.scala.
e result is presented in Figure 17. We run every experiment 20 times and con-
sider that the adversary succeeds if he wins at least once. Gray area in the gure shows
adversarial success.
Fig. 17.: Inuence of aacker’s stake to his hashrate.
e results show that even with 70% of total mining power, the adversary also needs
for about 20% of total stake to generate a beer chain than the honest party’s. Given
Bitcoin capitalization of $20 billion at the moment of writing, 20% of stake is about $4 bil-
lion. However, not all the stake is online so security projected into money would be about
lower level. It is hard to dene precisely how much stake is online in Bitcoin, and how
much it would be in case of PoS rewards being granted for that. Also, we have observed
only the simplest kind of aack in this experiment. e adversary can do beer, for ex-
ample, by exploiting network-level protocol with Eclipse aacks [Hei+15]. Nevertheless,
a malicious miner needs to spend a lot of money to overtake the honest parties.
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6.2.0.2 Light validation experiment
We estimate practically how ecient is the light validation procedure proposed in
the Section 5.2.4. For that, we compare two chain validators. A full validator is operating
with full state residing in a persistent key-value database. A light validator is checking
lookup proofs from blockheaders. Both validators are performing lookup operations only.
For the experiment, we use authenticated AVL+ trees from [Rey+16]. e full val-
idator code is using disk-based database MvStore with 128 MB in-memory LRU cache.
e experiment is started with a balance sheet of about 46 million (public key→ balance)
pairs (where a public key is about 32 bytes, a value is about 8 bytes). We then try bigger
sheets, up to 92 million pairs in size. us the testing dataset starts from a size like Bitcoin
UTXO set of today [Blo17] and nishes with twice of that size. We use a machine with i7
processor, 16 GB RAM and HDD disk (5400 RPM) for the experiment.
Fig. 18.: Balance lookup time.
Figure 18 shows running times for both the validators. e results show that our
light validator is running in eective constant time negligible to the running time of the
full validator (the running time of the light validator is about 20-25 microseconds per
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operation).
For the light validator, a proof of a block generator’s balance is to be included into a
block. We obtain proof sizes for dierent sizes of balance sheet, they are provided in the
Figure 19. e proof size for a Bitcoin-like balance sheet size (46M elements) is about 960
bytes and remains no more than kilobyte when balance sheet is about 92M elements.
Fig. 19.: Balance lookup proof size.
6.2.0.3 Proof-of-stake diculty experiments
In the Proof-of-Stake diculty readjustment formula (see Formula 5.2) we use the V
parameter to show the probability that a PoW-block is a successful block. In other words,
V indicates the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a stakeholder. Also,
1 − V value shows how many aempting blocks an average successful proof-of-work
block has included. However, in a distributed environment, real values could be dierent
from the planned ones because of propagation eects. To know the dierence wemade an
experiment where proof-of-stake block was sent to proof-of-work miner not immediately
but with a random delay distributed uniformly from 0 to 5% of target generation time. We
measure number of aempting blocks included into a successful blocks. Results provided
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in the Figure 20 show that in this scenario experimental numbers are close to the planned
ones.
Fig. 20.: Percentage of Aempting Blocks
We found that, given a constant stake, target value is changing with number of stake-
holders growing. e dependency is presented in the Figure 21.
Fig. 21.: T˜ Value
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6.2.1 Testnet
We launch TwinsCoin full-edged implementation over a publicly accessible testing
network (so-called “testnet” in cryptocurrency jargon). For that, we deploy TwinsCoin to
tens of machines, including AWS (Amazon) instances in the US, Europe, Asia, as well as
physical machines in Germany and Russia. Each node in the network is connected to 10
random neighbors. Every machine is participating in proof-of-work blocks mining, few
machines have public keys with stake on-board so generating proof-of-stake blocks also.
Target time between proof-of-work blocks is 10 minutes and V = 0.8.
User interface. Scorex generates a user interface (UI) automatically and few requests
regarding common functionality are available with no any eorts needed. In order to
add specic functionality, a coin developer needs to specify handlers for the additional
requests. e interface is available in a web browser. With the help of the UI, a TwinsCoin
user is able to see the hybrid blockchain contents, network peers and their statuses, wallet
public keys and corresponding balances. It is also possible to create a transaction (to send
tokens) via the user interface.
Monetary policy and incentives. e currency in the network has no emission, so
all the coins are issued in the initial state. Proof-of-Stake block generators are geing
transaction fees as rewards while Proof-of-Work miners are geing nothing (as nding a
proper incentives structure is le for further research).
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Appendix A
ABBREVIATIONS
VCU Virginia Commonwealth University
RVA Richmond Virginia
PoW Proof-of-work
PoS Proof-of-stake
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